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C H A P T E R - I 
HABEAS CORPUS: HISTORICAL RETROSPECT 
HABEAS CORPUS : HISTORICAL RETROSPECT 
Habeas Corpus is a latin word which may be rendered 
into English in some such form as 'you must have the body'. 
The writ is issued in form of an order calling upon the 
detaining or arresting authority to produce the deteneu 
before the court to determine the legality or illegality of 
such detention or arrest. If the court finds no legal 
justification for detention, it will order immediate 
release of the deteneu. 
Origins of the Writ 
The writ of habeas corpus can be traced to the 
thirteenth century, the words 'habeas corpus' were a 
familiar formula in the language of civil procedure, and it 
is likely that the phrase first appeared much earlier. The 
words simply represented a command, issued as a means or 
interlocutory process to have the defendant to an action 
brought physically before the court. The idea of producing 
the body with the cause of his detention was not present. 
Infact, there usually had been no detention at al 1 , and 
the purpose of the process was to order an officer to 
bring in the defendant, and not at all to subject the cause 
of a detention to the court's scrutiny. It has, even, been 
said that the early use of habeas corpus was to put people 
1. For details see. Pollock & others. The History of 
English Law, [2nd ed. 1952] p. 593. 
in'goal rather than to get them out, but this seems to have 
been a mistaken impression. Habeas corpus was used not to 
arrest and imprision, but to ensure the physical presence 
of a person in court on a certain day. There is some 
indication that 'habeas corpus' was also used to signify a 
command to the Sheriff to bring a person accused of crime 
before the court . Again, this seems to have been merely 
one way to have the party physically brought rn to face the 
charges against him where other methods had failed. The 
words 'habeas corpus' at this early stage were not 
connected with the idea of liberty, and the proce 
involved an element of the concept of due process of 1 
only in so far as it mirrored the refusal of the courts t 
decide a matter without having the defendant present. 
The earliest traces of habeas corpus, then appear to 
be its use an interlocutory process rather than an 
originating proceeding, really little more than an 
expression which appears from time to time in other 
proceeding. It was undoubtedly a significant indication of 
the authority and respect gained by the King's judges that 
a man could be brought into justice on their command, but 
for the association of these words with liberty, further 
development was required. 
ss 
aw 
o 
1. (1328) Selected cases in the court of King's Bench, 
Edw. Ill, Vol. V. V.[Selden Soc., Vol. 56] pp. 24-5. 
other Writs of Thirteenth Century 
There were three other writs which were more closely 
associated with the idea of liberty, de homine repleqiando, 
mainprize, and de odio et atia. The first two writs issued 
out of Chancery and were used to secure release on bail or 
mainprize pending trial for those prisoners so entitled. 
The last mentioned writ was available only in certain 
circumstances to obtain pre-trial release for a prisoner 
charged with homicide. These writs were all in desuetude 
by the seventeenth century , and habeas corpus developed 
quite idependently of them. These medieval writs really 
differed in a fundamental way from habeas corpus. They 
were not remedies of general application but special 
procedures for special situations. While they enabled 
prisoners to obtain release on bail or mainprize, the court 
didnot call for an explanation of the cause of imprisonment 
so that its legality could de determined as in the case of 
habeas corpus. The prisoner was simply given a 
temporary release pending trial. Later on, this could also 
happen on habeas corpus, where the prisoner was bailed, but 
the significant aspect of habeas corpus was that it brought 
the matter of the imprisonment before the court and 
provided the possibility for a fundamental and final 
determination. Most important of all, these writs were not 
available where the imprisonment was by virtue of the 
1. De homine replegiando was used as late as 1736 
Trebelock lAIK 633. 
Crown's order, and could not, therefore, be used by the 
lawyers of the seventeenth century in their contests with 
the Stuarls . 
Habeas Corpus and the Jurisdictional Conflict 
The cases which arose from the jurisdictional 
conflicts of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries mark the 
transition of the writ of habeas corpus form a device to 
secure the physical presence of a party to an unequivocal 
demand for the reasons for the applicants' detention so 
that the court could judge the sufficiency of the reasons. 
Habeas corpus proved to be a useful device in the struggle 
for control between the central courts of the crown and the 
local courts. There can be little doubt that its use in 
this contest fostered the concept of the writ requiring 
cause to be shown for the imprisonment. It was directed by 
the central courts against the local inferior jurisdictions 
and helped to channel the litigation, and the fees, towards 
a central administration. As it was important to be able 
to exert physical control over the parties in civil 
litigation, and as the ultimate sanction possessed by a 
court was attachment or committal, habeas corpus could be 
used to upset the course of litigation, and remove the 
sting from the efforts of the local courts to enforce their 
orders. At this level, habeas corpus was used by both the 
1. Janke's case (1976). 
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courts of common law and by the Chancery in their efforts 
to centralize the administration of justice. 
Harbeas corpus became one of the principal weapons in 
the struggle between common law and equity. At this level, 
the fact that the court of Chancery also had the power to 
issue the writ meant that the same weapon was available to 
both sides. While the common law courts did make more use 
of habeas corpus, there is at least one case in the reports 
to show that the court of Chancery also used the writ to 
3 
interrupt the process of the King's Bench . 
Chancery's chief device to control common law 
litigation was, however, the injunction and very early on, 
in 1482, the King's Bench made it clear that if the 
Chancellor used the power to grant injunctions to prevent 
litigants from suing at common law, habeas corpus would be 
available to release a suitor committed for breach of such 
4 
an injunction as well as trying to enjoin suits 
altogether, Chancery often granted injunctions to restrain 
the enforcement of a common law judgement which violated 
the principles of equity and the common law courts fought 
back by releasing on habeas corpus anyone committed for 
breach of an injunction . There are also examples of 
habeas corpus being used to protect the proceedings at law 
1. Spencer's Case (1615) 1 Rolle 316. 
2. Select cases in Chancery, Vol. 10, p. 8-9, 104, 121. 
3. Carie and Denis (1589) 1 Leon, p. 145. 
4. Russell's case Y.B. 22 Edw. IV P. 37 cited in Pound and 
Plucknett book Readings on the History and System of the 
Common Law (3rd ed. 1927) p. 197. 
5. Glanvile's Case (1614) by Moore K.B., p. 833. 
against interference from the court of Requests, and of its 
use by the King's Bench and common pleas against the 
Admiralty. 
The cases of the early years of the seventeenth 
century generally indicate a growing acceptance of habeas 
corpus us a device to test the legality of commitments, and 
in particular, there are numerous cases of prisoners being 
discharged or bailed having been committed by the High 
Commission. The High Commission cases particularly 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the writ where an attack 
was mounted against the jurisdiction of the tribunal 
ordering the committal. Perhaps the most significant 
development in the law of habeas corpus came with its use 
to test the validity of executive committals. By the time 
of Elizabeth, it was becoming clear that the claim to a 
power to commit for reasons of state could be tested on 
habeas corpus. There are cases as early 1567 in which 
habeas corpus was used by persons detained by order of the 
Privy Council to obtain their release on bail . Before 
that, in 1560, habeas corpus had figured in a dispute over 
the prerogative to appoint a court officer , and by 1587, 
in Searche's and Rowel's cases, it was shown to be a remedy 
fit to challenge the authority of the Crown. 
While the cases of the first part of the seventeenth 
century for the most part indicated a general acceptance 
1. Cases collected at Moore K.B., p. 838. 
2. Skrogges V Coleshil (1560) 2 Dyer, p.1759 
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that habeas corpus would always be available to test the 
legality of imprisonment, in their treatment of challenges 
to the executive or prerogative power, the courts began to 
show a certain lack of confidence. In one case, a prisoner 
committed by the Council for contempt was bailed where the 
court was not satisfied that the behaviour had been 
contemptuous, but this was an exception. 
The case of Darnel, 1627 was of major constitutional 
importance, which illustrates the extent of the development 
of habeas corpus by the early seventeenth century. In 
England power of the King to detention was challenged in 
the case of five Knights. It was the forced loan of 1626 
which raised the question of the power to detain the 
confinement without cause shown and which resulted in the 
Petition of Right. Amongst those arrested for refusal to 
pay were five knights. Darnel, Corbet, Earl, Haveningham 
and Hampden, who applied to the court of the King's Bench 
for writs of habeas corpus, directed to the warden of fleet 
to show the cause of imprisonment, that thereupon the 
court might determine whether the imprisonment was legal or 
illegal. The writs were granted and the warden made a 
return alleging that the prisoners were committed with no 
particular cause of commitment, but by special command of 
the Majesty. The return was held to be sufficient. Hyde, 
the learned Chief Judge, however, observed. Whether the 
1. The Five Knight's case, 
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conmitment be by the King or others, this court.is a place 
whether the King doth sit in person, and ve have the power 
to examine and if it appears that any man halt injury or 
wrongly his imprisonment, we have the power to deliver and 
discharge him, if otherwise he is to be remanded by us to 
prison. 
The Petition of Right was again flouted in the 
'Shipmoney Case', 1637, when the judges acquiesced in the 
King's imposition of a tax without Parliament's Sanction. 
At the same time, however, the reports from this period do 
yield cases of habeas corpus being used with effect, even 
in the case of committal by the King or Council. 
There is, however, ample evidence that it was in use 
before the days of Magna Charta. The earliest precedents 
where it was used against the Crown are to be found in the 
reign of Henry VII. Afterwards its use became frequent and 
in the time of Charles I it was held to be an admitted 
constitutional remedy. 
The Habeas Corpus Act 
Hill in his note to the 'Meleod Case', has given an 
illuminating description of the origin and history of the 
writ of habeas corpus. He observed, the immediate cause of 
passing the Habeas Corpus Act of 31, Car. II, Ch. 2, was 
the opression practised towards an obscure individual by 
the name of Jenkes. Jenkes had made a speech in London 
1. See Appendix - I. 
urging the case of a new Parliament and Petitioning the 
King to make the call. For this, he was summoned before 
the King Charles II in Council, who with the Lord 
Chancellor and others of the Council, browbeat him to 
prison, under a warrant issued by the council, assigning on 
its face the above trivial cause. Through the evasions 
practiced by the Chancellor and the Chief Justice, who then 
held their office during the King's pleasure, Jenkes lay in 
jail several weeks before he was let to bail. This statute 
introduced no new principle, though the occasion for 
passing it was entirely adequate, viz., the arbitrary 
imprisonment of the subject by the King himself. The 
nation had been partially awakened to the question by the 
several instances of a like character in that and the 
previous reign attended with other acts of evasion by which 
trials were greatly delayed. This was the reason for that 
part of the Habeas Corpus Act, directing the bailing or 
discharing of persons properly imprisoned, if their trials 
were unreasonably postponed. 
In England, the right to the writ of Habeas Corpus is 
a right which exists at common law independently of any 
statute though the right has been confirmed and regulated 
by statute. At common law this jurisdiction was excercised 
by the court of King's Bench, Chancery and Common Pleas, 
and in a case of privilage by the court of Exchequer. This 
jurisdiction is now exercised by the King's Bench Division 
1. See Appendix - III. 
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and the Judges of the High Court of Justice . 
Besides Common Law there are three statutes which 
regulates the right. 
(i) The Habeas Corpus Act, 1640 
This statute, entitled 'An Act for the regulating of 
the Privy Council and for taking away the court commonly 
called the Star Chamber', recites the provisions of Magna 
Charta and the statutes of the reign of Edward III relating 
to the liberty of the subject. This statute, which is 
still in force, was intended further to secure the liberty 
of the subject by regulating the issue of the writ in the 
particular case of infringement of the right of personal 
security at the hands of the King or of the Privy Council 
and was necessitated by the cases of arbitrary imprisonment 
which were very prevalent at the date of the statute. The 
statute gives to any person restrained of his liberty or 
suffering imprisonment by command of the King or of his 
Privy Council, the right, upon demand or motion made in 
open court, to the immediate issue of a writ of Habeas 
Corpus to be directed to the gaoler other person in whose 
custody he may be. The person to whom the writ is directed 
must, at the return of writ, produce in the open court the 
body of theparty so committed or restrained, and must then 
certify the true cause of his detention or imprisonment. 
1. Sees. 4 and 18, Supreme Court of Judicature (consolida-
tion) Act, 1925. 
Sec. 6, Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act, 1938. 
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within three days after such return, the court may proceed 
to examine and determine whether the cause of such 
commitment appearing upon the return is just and legal or 
not, and must deliver, bail, or remand the prisoner 
accordingly, under penalty of treble damages forefeitable 
to the party aggrieved. The judges were required to 
pronounce upon the legality of the detention within three 
days time. A judge or other offficer who failed to act in 
compliance with the statute was made subject to heavy fines 
and liable in damages to the party aggrieved. 
Yet a few months after this Act, which appeared to 
remove the means for evasion, the Grand Remonstrance was 
registered by the Common, and it contained clauses 
complaining about the abuse of executive committals . The 
2 
Habeas Corpus Act 1640 had not been completely effective, 
and indeed, it was becoming increasingly clear that the 
crisis of State was not to be resolved by law alone. In one 
of the case, the judges seemed to be ready to bail the 
prisoners, but changed their minds when directly threatened 
with loss of office by Cromqwll. 
(ii) The Habeas Corpus Act 1679 
This statute was. passed 'for the better securing the 
liberty of the subject'. 
1. Art. 11-15: Gardiner, Constitutional Documents of the 
Puritan Revolution, 209. 
2. See Appendix II. 
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While playing a significant role in the constitutional 
struggles of the day, habeas corpus had been gradually 
becoming an accepted remedy in the more ordinary cases. It 
continued to be used in civil suits but there are also 
instances in the seventeenth century of its use in used 
custody cases, and to test the validity of ordinary 
criminal committals. In 'Dr. Alphonso's Case', the court 
ordered the release of a prisoner committed for unlawful 
medical practice by the college of Physicians, and in 
another case, the court released an irate citizen who had 
been committed by his major for contempt. By the Habeas 
Corpus Act 1679, any person committed or detained in the 
vacation for any crime, except for felony or treason 
plainly expressed in the warrant of commitment, or any one 
in his behalf, may apply to the Lord Chancellor, or any 
Judges of the High Court of Justice, who, upon view of the 
copy of the warrant of commitment, or upon oath made that 
such copy was denied by the gaoler, is under penalty 
required, upon the request in writing by the person 
detained or any one on his behalf, attested and subscribed 
by two witnesses to award a Habeas Corpus under the seal of 
the court of which he is a Judge returnable imraediately 
before him. 
By the time of the Restoration, it had become an 
accepted remedy, more or less in the present form. The 
deliberate efforts of the Stuarts, and then Cromwell, to 
13 
flout the force of the writ had merely fixed in the popular 
conception the principle that the writ should be freely and 
quickly available to challenge any commitment. The writ 
had, however, evolved in an uncertain. Sometimes 
precipitate, fashion from humble origins, and there were 
consequent procedural defects which could impair its 
operation despite the acceptance it had gained. Perhaps 
the most important of there was the question whether or not 
the writ could be issued in vacation. The source of this 
difficulty may well have been in the original use of habeas 
corpus to remove civil cases from inferior courts. The 
could only be done in term, when the cause could be heard 
at Westminister. Practice may have been slow to catch-up 
with the changing function. A similar question arose 
concerning the power of the Common Pleas to grant the writ 
in ordinary criminal cases. For a longtime, the court had 
granted the writ where the applicant had the privilage of 
the court, but there was some authority to the effect that 
since only the King's Bench could proceed upon the cause in 
a criminal case if the return were good, the common pleas 
could not act in such cases. 
The operation of this statute has at various periods 
been temporarily suspended by the parliament on grounds of 
political emergencies in case of specific offences 
enumerated in the surpending Acts, but the common law right 
to the writ of Habeas Corpus in all other cases remained 
14 
unaffected . 
(iii) The Habeas Corpus Act, 1816 
Under this statute any person confined or restrained 
of his liberty within England and Wales, the town of 
Berwick-upon-Twead or the Isles of Jersey upon complaint 
made to the court by him, or on his behalf, supported by 
affidavit or affirmation and there is probable and 
reasonable ground for which complaint, is entitled in 
vacation time to a writ of Habeas Corpus under the Seal of 
the court to be directed to the person or persons in whose 
custody or power he may be, returnable immediately before 
the person awarding writ or before any other Judge of the 
court issuing the writ. 
1. Ex parte Howsin; (1917), p. 33 
15 
The Writ of Habeas Corpus in U.S.A. 
The United States of America has Habeas Corpus as an 
heritage from England, in its Common Law later recognised 
by the Constitution of U.S. Article 1, Section 9(2) States 
that the privilage of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not 
be suspended unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion, 
the public safety may require it. Only the congress can 
suspend the writ. Each judge of the Supreme Court can 
issue the writ. Even District Courts in U.S. can issue the 
writ. The chief use of writ in Administrative Law has been 
in alien cases. 
In an opinion by Chief Justice Chase, the Supreme 
Court of the United States elaborately reviewed the 
history, purpose and nature of this great writ. It was 
stated: 'The great writ of habeas corpus has been for 
centuries esteemed the best and only sufficient defence of 
personal freedom.' 
It was brought in America by the colonists and claimed 
as among the immemorid rights descended upon them by their 
anceston. Naturally, therefore, when the confederated 
colonies became the United States, and the formation of a 
Common Government engaged their deliberations in 
convention, this great writ found prominent sanction in the 
Constitution. Vve find that the first congress under the 
constitution, after defining by various sections of the Act 
of September 24, 1789, the jurisdiction of the district 
16 
courts, the Circuit Courts and the Supreme Court in other 
cases, proceeded in the 14th Section to enact 'that all the 
aforementioned courts of the United States shall have power 
to issue the writ of habeas Corpus and all other writs not 
specially provided by Statute, which may be necessary for 
the exercise of their respective jurisdiction and agreeable 
to the principles and usages of law'. In the same section 
it was further provided 'that either of the Justices of the 
Supreme Court as well as Judges of the District Courts, 
shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the 
purpose of inquiry into the cause of commitment: provided 
that writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to 
prisoners in jail, unless they are in custody, under or by 
color of authority of the United States, or are committed 
for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary 
to be broght before the court to testify.' 
The Supreme Court is one of the courts to which the 
power to issue writs of habeas corpus is expressly given by 
the terms of this section, has neverbeen questioned. It 
would have been indeed a remarkable anomaly if this court, 
ordained by the Constitution for the exercise in the United 
States of the most important powers in civil cases, of all 
the highest courts of England, had been denied, under a-
constitution which absolutely prohibits the suspensions of 
the writ, except under extraordinary exigencies that power 
1. 1 Stat, at 4.81 
17 
in case of alleged unlawful restraint, which the Habeas 
Corpus Act of Charles II expressly declares these courts 
possess. But the power vested in the court has an edge 
over the English courts. The jurisdiction of this court is 
conferred by the constitution and is appellate; whereas 
that of the English court, is derived from the Common Law 
and is original. 
The United States constitution does not expressly give 
the Federal Court the power to grant the writ. It merely 
provides: 'The privilage of the writ of the habeas corpus 
shall not be suspended unless when in cases of rebellion or 
2 
invasion the public safety may require it.' The ultimate 
question involved in a habeas corpus proceeding is one of 
jurisdiction. Habeas corpus will be either where a person 
is imprisoned for an act which amounts to no crime or which 
does not amount to any offence known to the law. The 
Judiciary Act of 1789, gave either the Justices of the 
Supreme Court or the Judges of District Courts power to 
grant writs of habeas corpus provided people in Jail 
claiming the writ 'are in custody under or by color of 
authority of the United States or are committed for trial 
before some court of the same, or are necessary to be 
brought into the court to testify.' This Act did not 
confer jurisdiction on other Federal Court and the Act of 
1. The Constitution of India, Art 324 226 where specific 
power has been given to the Supreme Court and the High 
Courts. 
2. Art. 1 Sec. 9 CI. 2. 
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1891, creating the circuit courts of appeal was silent on 
the subject, so that these courts do not have the power to 
issue writs of habeas corpus except in aid of a 
jurisdiction already obtained. The Act of 1789 made no 
provision for the release by the Federal Courts of persons 
in custody by order of state authorities. The Force Act of 
1833, consequently gave the Federal Courts the Power to 
issue writs' in all cases where he or they shall be 
comitted or confined or by an authority or law for any act 
done or omitted to be done in pursuance of a law of the 
United States or any order, process or decree of any Judge 
or court thereof.' In 1842 an act further broadened the 
authority of the Federal Courts by permitting them to issue 
the writ whenever a 'subject or a citizen of a foreign 
state, domiciled therein, is in custody because of an act 
done or omitted under an alleged right, titled, authority, 
privilage, protection or exception claimed under the 
Commission or order or sanction of any foreign state or 
under control thereof, the validity or effect of which is 
dependent upon the law of nations.' In 1867 the 
jurisdiction of Federal Courts was further broadened by an 
act of permitting them to issue the writ' in all cases 
where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in 
violation of the constitution or any treaty or law of the 
United State. The writ in U.S.A. lies in all causes of 
1. Whitney V. Dick (1906) 202 U.S. 132. 
IV 
imprisonment by commitment or restraint from whatsoever 
cause or under whatever pretence. The great object of the 
writ is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned 
without sufficient cause. It is in the nature of a writ of 
error to examine the legality of the commitment, detension 
or restraint, the proper remedy for all unlawful 
2 
imprisonment both in civil and criminal cases, the remedy 
which the law gives for the enforcement of the civil right 
of personal remedy. 
Suspension of Habeas Corpus in United States 
'The privilage of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not 
be suspended, unless when in cases of Rebellion or Invasion 
3 
the public safety may require it.' One of the 
propositions offered by Charles Pinckney and referred to 
the committee of Detail related to habeas corpus' . The 
privilages and benefit of the writ of habeas corpus shall 
be enjoyed in this government in the most expeditious and 
ample manner: and shall not be suspended by the legislature 
except upon the most urgent and pressing occasions, and for 
a limited time' Rutledge did not suppose that a suspension 
could ever be necessary at the same time through all the 
states, Wilson also doubted whether suspension could be 
necessary, as the courts would have discretionary power 
whether 'to keep in Gaol or admit to Bail'. 
1. Wales V. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 
2. Ex parte Mc Cullough, 35 Cal. 97. 
3. Art. I Sec. 9, CI, 2. 
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Habeas Corpus is a traditional safeguard of the 
liberty of citizens. It prevents arbitrary imprisonment by 
the government without legal ground. According to the 
celebrated Samuel Johnson in conversation with Boswell in 
September, 1769, 'The habeas corpus is single advantage 
which our government has over that of other countries.' 
The writ directs the officer having custody of the prisoner 
to produce his body in court, together with the reasons for 
2 
his detension. If the grounds are not sufficient in law, 
the prisoner is released. 
This clause does not explicitly specify by whom the 
privilage of habeas corpus may be 'suspended'. The better 
view seems to be that suspension must be authorized by 
Congress. This view is supported by language used by Chief 
Justice Marshall in a case involving accomplices of Aaron 
Burr who was held on a charge of treason: 'If at anytime 
the public safety should require the suspension... it is 
for the legislature to say so. That question depends on 
political considerations on which the legislature is to 
3 
decide.' During the war of 1861-65, President Lincoln 
claimed that the executive could exercise this power. In a 
celebrated case where a civilian resident of Maryland had 
been confined on Fort McHenry, near Baltimore, at the order 
of a military commander in Pennsylvania, Chief Justice 
1. Baswell, The life of Samnel Johnson, I, 358. 
2. The Habeas Corpus Act, 167 9 (31 Car.^ II, C. 2) 
strengthened procedure for obtaining release. 
3. Ex parte Bollman, 2 Cr. 75, 101 (1807). 
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Taney issued the writ and when the prisoner was not 
produced issued an attachment against the Commander of the 
fort for contempt. The marshal could not get into the fort 
to serve this process, and Taney excused him from further 
efforts in view of the impossibility of over coming the 
resistance of the military authorities by summoning a porse 
comitatus to enforce court's orders. The Chief Justice 
directed that the clerk of the court forward a copy of the 
proceedings to the president, whose constitutional duty it 
was to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 
One of the convincing arguments relied on by Taney in 
his opinion to support the conclusion that only congress 
can suspend the privilege of habeas corpus is the fact that 
this clause is found in Article I of the constitution, 
among the restrictions upon the legislature powers of 
congress, and not in Article II dealing with the executive 
power. 
A proposal to suspend habeas corpus was defeated in 
the Senate after it was passed in the House of 
2 
Representatives. In 1863, congress enacted an ambiguous 
decleration 'That, during the present rebellion, the 
President of the United States, whenever, in his opinion, 
the public safety may require it, is authorized to suspend 
the privilage of the writ of habeas corpus in any case 
1. Exparte Merryman, Fed. Cas. No. 9487 (1861). 
2. Henry Adams, History of the United States, III, 338, 340 
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throughout the United States, or any part thereof.' In 
Indiana where the civil courts were open and no hostilities 
where in progress, a citizen was arrested by the army and 
condemned to death by a military tribunal. The Supreme 
Court held, after peace was restored, that he was entitled 
to be discharged on habeas corpus. 
The court conceded that 'it is essential to the safety 
of every government that in a great crisis, like the one we 
have just passed through, there should be a power somewhere 
of suspending the writ of habeas corpus'. But 'the 
constitution goes no further. It does not say after a writ 
of habeas corpus is denied to a citizen, he shall be tried 
otherwise than by the course of the common law.' Civilians 
can not be subjected to martial rule when the civil court, 
2 
are open for business. The court emphasized that 'The 
suspension of the privilage of the writ habeas corpus does 
not suspend the writ itself. The writ issues as a matter 
of course; and on the return made to it the court decides 
whether the party applying is denied the right of 
proceeding further with it.' 
1. Act of March 3, 1863, 12 St. 755. 
2. Ex-parti Milligam, 4 How. 2, 125, 126, 127 (1866). 
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The Writ of Habeas Corpus in England 
Habeas Corpus is a form of writ which, according to 
its dictionary meaning, is 'a writ to jailor to produce a 
prisoner in person and to state the reasons of his 
detension.' Lord Dunning, in his famous book 'Freedom 
under the Law' has tried to give a comprehensive definition 
the scope and the jurisdiction as prevelant in the 
countries where rule of law is considered as a primary 
feature in the political structure. 'In the first place 
the law says that no man is to be imprisoned except by 
judgement of the King's Court or whilst awaiting trial by 
them. This freedom is safeguarded by the most famous writ 
in England, the writ of Habeas Corpus. Whenever any man in 
England is detained against his will, not by sentence of 
the King's Courts, but by anyone else, when he or any one 
on his behalf is entitled to apply to any of the judges of 
the High Court to determine whether his detention is lawful 
or not. The court will then, by this writ, command the 
gaoler or whoever is detaining him, to bring him before the 
court; and, unless the detention is shown to be lawful, the 
court will atonce set him free.' But this was not always 
so. In 1627, when the executive Government Cas Sir Thomas 
Darnel and four other Kinghts into prison because they 
would not subscribe money for the king, the court of King's 
Bench, to its disgrace, held, that if a man were committed 
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by command of the King he was not be delivered by Habeas 
Corpus . Those were the evil days when the judges took 
then orders from the executive. 
In England habeas corpus is of common lav/ origin. But 
its effectiveness was secured by the Habeas Corpus Act of 
1640, 1679 and 1816. The Habeas Corpus Act of 1862 defined 
its issue into the King's domains. The writ was passed as 
2 
a result of the decision m Anderson where the writ was 
issued to Canada. That Act provided that no writ of habeas 
corpus should issue out of England by authority any English 
judge or court of Justice into any colony or foreign 
dominion of the Crown where the Crown has lawfully 
established, a court or courts of justice having authority 
to grant and issue the writ and enforce its due execution 
throughout that colony or dominion. 
The historical account of the writ of habeas corpus 
shows that the writ is available in all cases of wrongful 
deprivation of personal liberty and is available against 
3 
the Crown, its ministers and its servents. By it, judges 
of the High Court, at the instance of an aggrieved person, 
command the production of that subject inquire into the 
cause of his detention and if there is no legal 
justification for it, order his release. It follows that 
the writ is remedial and not punitive for as stated in 
1. Darvel's case 3 St. Tr. 1. 
2. Ex. P. Anderson (1861) 3E & E 487, 121 E.R. 525 
3-'. Halsbury, 'Laws of England', Vol. II, p. 25. 
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Gossage. Gossage's case held that the writ could not be 
issued to a person who had once, though not at the time of 
the issue of the writ, unlawfully detained or wrongly 
parted with the custody of another. It also held that the 
writ was not an appropriate procedure for punishing a 
person for wrongful conduct in parting with custody before 
the issue of the writ. 
The writ is available not only to a subject of the 
Crown but to all persons within the realm who are under the 
protection of the Crown and entitled to resort to the 
courts to secure any rights which they may have, whether 
they are alien friends or alien enemies. The great 
constitutional importance of the writ lies in the fact that 
it is available to the meanest in the realm against the 
mightiest, with one exception, namely, that it is not 
2 
available to a prisoner of war , or an enemy alien whose 
internment is considered by the excentive desirable in the 
interest of the safety of the realm and who, on his 
internment, can properly be described as a prisoner of war 
for the purposes of a writ of habeas corpus. This is so 
because though the liberty of the subject is sacred, 'above 
3 the liberty of the subject is the safety of the realm.' 
Many of the purposes for which the writ was granted in 
the past are now only of historical interest. In modern 
1. Halsbury, 'Laws of England', Vol. II, p. 25. 
2. The three Spanish Sailor Case (1779) E.R. 775. 
3. Halsbury, 'Laws of England', Vol. II, p. 25. 
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practice, the purposes for which the writ is most 
frequently used, are: (1) to test the regularity 
ofcommitments and particularly commitments for extradiction 
and of fugitine offendus; (2) the investigation of the 
right to thecustody of infants. 
Since Arts. 105 and 194 of the Indian Constitution 
confer on the Union and the State legislatures the same 
powers, privilages and immunities as were enjoyed by the 
British House of Commons, at the commencement of 
the constitution, we may state briefly the power of the 
courts to review the committal by the House of Conmions of a 
2 
person for contempt of the House Stockdale V. Hansard 
established that it was for the courts to determine the 
nature and extent of the privilage claimed by either House 
of parliament, but once the existence of the privilage was 
established, effect must be given to it. The case of the 
3 
Sheriff of Middlesex established that when a person not a 
member is committed for contempt of either House of 
Parliament, the court will not review the committal or 
grant a discharge on habeas corpus, if the return shows 
that the committal was for a contempt of either House. 
The person illigally detained is entitled to apply for 
a writ of habeas corpus, but it is not necessary that it 
should proceed for him. Any person entitled to institute 
1. Halsbury, 'Laws of England', Vol. II, p. 31. 
2. (1839) 9A & E. 1, 112 E.R. p. 1112. 
3. (1840) llA & E. 273, 113 E.R. 419. 
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proceedings for the purpose of liberating another may apply 
for the writ where access to the person illegally detained 
is denied, the application may be made by any relation or 
friends. 
It was at one time supposed that it was open to a 
person to apply successively to every court competent to 
issue a writ, and that each tribunal was under an 
obligation to determine the matter on the merits unfeltered 
by the decision of any other tribunal of co-ordinate 
jurisdiction, even though the grounds in the application 
were exactly the same. Thus the applicant could go from 
one judge to another until he could find one more merciful 
than his bretheren. The judgement of the Privy Council in 
Eshugbayi Eleko V. Officer Administering the Government of 
2 . . . 
Nigeria supported the above view. But in In re Hastings 
3 (No. 2) the whole matter was reconsidered. Lord Parker 
C.J. held that there had been a right to go from court to 
court, and a right, during vacation, to go from judge to 
judge, because during vacation, judges did not sit 'in 
bane', and the applicant was entitled to the opinion of the 
full court. He accordingly held that once an applicant had 
been heard by a divisional bench of the Queen's Bench 
Division, he could not be heard again on a renewed 
application made on the same evidence and the same grounds 
by another divisional court of the same Division, as the 
1. Haisbury, 'Laws of England', Vol. 11, p. 37 
2. (1928) A.C. 459, (1928) All E.R. Rep. 598. 
3. (1959) 1 Q.B. 358. 
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decision of a divisional court was equivalent to the 
decision of all the judges of the Queen's Bench Division. 
It was found unnecessary to pronounce on the right of an 
applicant to go from judge to judge. As Lord Parker had 
confined his judgement strictly to the question whether the 
applicant should move another divisional bench of the court 
of Queen's Bench, the applicant applied for habeas corpus 
to the Chancery Division Varisey J. held that since the 
Judicature Act/ 1873, the courts of the Queen's Bench 
Division and the court of Chancery no longer existed as 
separate courts; there was one High Court to which all the 
puisne judges were appointed and they were then assigned to 
do the business of a particular division. Therefore, an 
applicant for a writ of habeas corpus in a criminal causes 
or matters who had once been heard by a divisional court of 
the Queen's Bench could not be heard again on a renewed 
application made on the same evidence and the same grounds, 
by a divisional court of the Chancery Division, since the 
decision of the divisional court was equivalent to the 
2 
decision of all the judges of the High Court Harman J. 
concurred and held that an applicant had not and never had 
a right to move successively from judge to judge of the 
3 
same division otherwise than during the vacation. 
S. 14(2) of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1960, now 
provides that when an application for habeas corpus has 
1. (1959) 1 Q.B. at p. 378. 
2. (1959) 1 All E.R. 698. 
3. (1959) Ch. at pp. 379, 380 
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once been made in a civil or criminal matter, no such 
application should be made on the same grounds in respect 
of the same person to any court or judge unless fresh 
evidence is produced in support of the application. 
In the case of Cox V. Hakes , it was admitted that S. 
19 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, was wide 
enough, if literally construed, to justify the conclusion 
that an appeal lay from an order discharging the applicant 
on a writ of habeas corpus. Accordingly, it was held by 
the majority of the House that S. 19 should be narrowly 
construed, and that no appeal lay to the court of Appeal. 
2 In Secretary of State for Home Affairs V. O'Brien , it was 
3 
held, applying the decision of Cox V. Hakes , that not 
withstanding the generality of the language of S. 3 of the 
Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, the House had no 
jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from an order of a 
competent court for the issue of a habeas corpus where the 
court determines the illegality of the applicant's 
detension and his right to liberty, although the order does 
not direct his discharge. 
'The operation of the Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, has at 
various periods been temporarily suspended by the 
legislature on the ground of urgent political necessity. 
The suspension has usually been effected by a status 
enabling persons to be arrested under conditions specified 
1. (1890) 15 App. Cas. 506. 
2. (1923) A.C. 603, All. E.R. Rep. 442, 
3. (1890) 15 App. Cas. 506. 
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in the status and detained in custody without bail or 
trial, notwithstanding any law to the contarary. Such an 
enactment while it remains in force, in no sense abrogates 
or suspends the general right to the writ at Common Law. ' 
1. Halsbury, ^ Laws of England', Vol. 11, p. 29 
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The Writ Under the Indian Constitution 
The New Constitution of the Dominion of India provides 
that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal 
liberty except according to the procedure established by 
law. Article 22 contains further provisions for the 
protection against arrest and detention in certain cases. 
The writ of habeas corpus has been classed among the 
constitutional remedies to which a citizen is entitled as 
of right. By virtue of Art. 32,(2) the Supreme Court is in 
express terms, vested with the power to issue directions, 
orders or writs in the nature of the writ of habeas corpus, 
and in sub-clause (4) it is further provided that the right 
shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by 
the constitution. Parliament may also be law, confer on 
the Supreme Court power to issue directions or orders in the 
nature of the writ of habeas corpus other than those 
mentioned in the Article 32 Clause (2), which relates to 
the enforcement of fundamental rights. Notwithstanding 
anything contained in Art. 32, every High Court enjoys the 
power, throughout the territories in relation to which it 
exercises jurisdiction, to issue directions or orders in 
the nature of the writ of habeas corpus for the enforcement 
of any rights conferred by Part III of the constitution and 
2 
for any other purpose. The power conferred on the High 
1. Article 139. 
2, Article 226(1). 
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Court by clause (1) above shall not be in derogation of the 
power conferred on the Supreme Court by Article 32 
Clause (2) . Thus the present position is that apart from 
the provisions of Sec. 491, Cr. P.C, the Supreme Court and 
the several High Courts have the power to issue direction, 
orders or writs including writs in the nature of the writ 
of habeas corpus for enforcement of the right of personal 
liberty of the subject. 
But in the Full Bench case of Anant Bhaskar Lagu V. 
2 
State in the Madhya BharatHigh Court, Lordshxps Kaul C.J., 
and Shinde J., took a different view. Their Lordships 
held: 'The Constitution contemplates two kinds of remedies 
for enforcement of fundamental rights:-
(i) Constitutional remedies, i.e., expressly given by the 
constitution, 
(ii) remedies available under the ordinary law of the land. 
Article 32 deals with a remedy expressly given by the 
constitution and called constitutional remedy while Art. 
226 relates to a different subject altogether. It confers 
certain powers upon High Courts which they may use in the 
exercise of any jurisdiction, vested in them by virtue of 
Art. 225 or any other provision of the constitution. The 
subject matter of Article 226 is not any jurisdiction which 
the High Court can exercise, nor any relief which it can 
1. Article 226(2) . 
2. A.I.R. 1950 M.B. 60 (F.B.) 
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give in exercise of a jurisdiction vested in it. It does 
not deal with either of those matters. On the other hand, 
it confers upon High Courts certain powers which they may 
use for giving relief in exercise of their jurisdiction. 
The extent of jurisdiction of High Courts, the cases in 
which it can be exercised and the procedure by which it can 
be invoked are matters wholly outside the perview of 
Art. 226. Article 226 does not find place in Part III wich 
deals with fundamental rights and the constitutional 
remedies for enforcement thereof. This article belongs to 
a set of Articles which deal with judiciary in the 
state. 
'Unlike Art. 32 of the Constitution, Art. 226 does not 
provide for any remedy which apart from the existing law 
could be available to a person for enforcement of any of 
the rights dealt with in Part III of the Constitution, 
i.e., fundamental rights. Articles 226 must be read 
subject to Art. 32. Article 226 only mentions some of the 
powers which, if law made by Parliament or other 
appropriate legislatures, so provided may be exercised by 
the High Courts under circumstances and conditions 
prescribed by such law. But so long as this is not done 
the powers conferred by Articles 226 must remain 
ineffective except in so far as they can be exercised under 
the existing law.' 
Their Lordship accordingly held that the High Court 
can not entertain an application under Article 226 for 
34 
issue of a direction in the nature of habeas corpus apart 
from the provisions of Sec. 491, Criminal Procedure Code , 
Mehta, J., in his dissenting judgement observed, 'Article 
226 is self-contained providing for the extent of 
jurisdiction to be exercised by High Court and also 
indicating the relief which can be granted by issue of 
appropriate writs. The porocedure is indicated by rule 
making power under Art. 225. The circumstances under which 
the powers can be invoked are also indicated. The framers 
of the constitution did not contemplate that under Art. 226 
only remedies available under the ordinary law of the land 
should be exercised by High Courts, in view of the 
provisions contained in Art. 226. It has widened and 
enlarged the jurisdiction, and powers of the High Court and 
has provided remedies. The framers of the constitution did 
not intend that the powers conferred by Art. 226 can become 
effective only after the necessary provision as to the 
circumstances and conditions in v/hich they can be exercised 
and the requisite jurisdiction to exercise them is made by 
appropriate legislation. The exercise of powers conferred 
by Art. 226 is not left to the uncertainty of future 
legislation.' 
The view of Mehta, J., finds support in subsequent 
decisions of other High Courts as well. In In re Prahlad 
Krishna , the Bombay High Court held that under Art. 22 6 
1. A.I.R. 1951 Bom. 25. 
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the High Court has been given the power to issue any 
direction, any order, or any writ for the enforcement of 
fundamental rights and to the extent that the High Court may 
think it necessary to issue the common law writ of habeas 
corpus for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights, it has 
been given that power notwithstanding the fact that the 
power may be outside Sec. 491, Criminal Procedure Code and 
may be wider than the power conferred under that section. 
In view of the wider powers of the High Court under Art. 
226, the provisions of sec. 491, criminal procedure code 
can be treated as practically superseded by Art. 226. 
2 
Similarly in the matter of Venkateswarlu, Govinda Menon J. 
observed: 'Though the original application was under 
Sec. 491, Criminal Procedure Code we are invited to dispose 
of it under the powers conferred on this Court under 
Art. 226 of the constitution of India as the latter 
provision has superseded all provisions of the Criminal 
Procedure Code which gave power and authority to the High 
Court to issue writs in the nature of habeas corpus.' 
It may, however, be noted that the writ of habeas 
corpus and the orders which the High Courthad power to pass 
under Sec. 491, Criminal Procedure Code are essentially 
directed against illegal detention, and hence the decisions 
with reference to Sec. 491, Criminal Procedure Code may be 
usefully referred for purposes of Arts. 32 and 226. 
1. Ram Manoher V. Sundaram, A.I.R. 1955 Manipur 41 
2. A.I.R. 1951 Mad. 226, 270. 
C H A P T E R - I I 
CONDITIONS FOR THE ISSUE OF THE WRIT 
CONDITION FOR THE ISSUE OF THE WRIT 
Many of the purposes for which the writ has been 
utilized in the past are now matters of historical 
importance. Aliens who had been brought to England as 
slaves had attained freedom by means of habeas corpus . In 
2 
Hottentot Venus , a rule for a writ of habeas corpus was 
granted upon the allegation that an ignorant and helpless 
foreigner hasbeen brought to this country and exhibited 
against her consent by those who held her in their custody. 
The Writ was at one time also used as a means of securing 
freedom in cases of illegal imprisonment for the naval or 
military forces of the Crown, but imprisonment, though 
within certain limits legal as a means of recruiting in the 
case of the navy and based on the royal prerogative, is no 
3 
longer resorted to. During the first world war attempts 
were made to use the writ as a means of escaping from the 
compulsory military service under the provisions of the 
4 
Military Service Acts. 
In modern times the writ is most frequently invoked to 
test the validity of detention in public or private 
custody. A person who is custody under a warrant or order 
of commitment may test the validity of the warrent or order 
under which he is detained by means of the writ of habeas 
1. Sommer Sett's Case (1972) 20 St.T.l. 
2. (1810) 13 East. 195. 
3. R.V. King (1694) Comb. 245. 
4. R.V. Mornhill Camp (1917) 1 K.B. 176. 
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corpus irrespective of the fact whether he is imprisoned 
under the sentence of a naval, military or ecclesiastical 
court or interned under the authority of some emergency 
state. The High Court is competent to issue a writ of 
habeas corpus for the production of a person illegally or 
improperly detained in public custody under executive 
orders. 
There are various conditions on which the writ of 
habeas corpus can be issued. 
(i) Detention : 
The very object of issuing a writ of habeas corpus is 
to have it ascertained whether the person who is sought to 
be brought before the court is under duress or imprisonment 
2 
and whether the detention is illegal or irregular. The 
High Court will interfere and order a person to be set at 
liberty only when he is illegally and unproperly detained 
3 
in public or private custody. 
There must be detention : The general rule is that in 
order to make a case for habeas corpus there must be an 
actual confinement. Mere moral restraint is not 
sufficient. The test as to the right to the writ is the 
existence of such imprisonment or detention, actual though 
it may not be, as deprives one of the privilages of going 
1. Bissewar Roy V. Emperor, 1925, A.I.R. Cal. 961. 
2. Yaswant V. Emperor, A.I.R. 1938 Nag. 513 (F.B.) 
3. Girdharilal V. Emperor, A.I.R. 1935 All. 181. 
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be so relieved wives restrained by husbands, children 
withheld from the proper parent or guardian, persons held 
under arbitrary custody by private individuals, as in a 
work-house, as well as those under Military Control, may 
also become proper subjects of relief by the writ of habeas 
corpus. Obviously, the extent and the character of the 
restraint which justifies the writ must vary accordingly to 
the nature of the control which is asserted over the party 
in whose behalf the writ is prayed.' 
In case of a person going at large with no one 
controlling or watching him or detaining him, his body 
cannot be produced by the person to whom the writ is 
directed, unless by consent of the alleged prisoner or by 
his capture and forcible production into the presence of 
the Court. 
There must be some kind of physical restraint .on the 
liberty of movement of a person for invoking the writ. The 
words 'detained', 'custody' and 'be set at liberty' in 
Sec. 491, Cr. P.C. also imply some sort of confinement or 
physical restraint on liberty of movement. Where no 
restraint of any kind has been placed on the personal 
movement of a person but 'people are allowed to see him 
only after obtaining previous permission of certain 
2 
authorities, there is no detention. The Nagpur High Court 
1. V^ Iales V. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564. 
2. Mst. Hazoor Ara Begam V. Deputy Commissioner, Gonda, 
A.I.R. 1934 Oudh, 302. 
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has held that a person who is not in detention, actual or 
constructive but who has been ordered to leave India and 
proceed to Pakistan cannot be said to be in confinement. 
But it may be noted that actual physical confinement is not 
necessary to constitute detention. Control and custody are 
enough. 
Release on bail : Though a person may be released on bail 
after the arrest, he can nevertheless apply for habeas 
corpus because his liberty is subject to restraint 
2 
according to the nature of the bail bond. Even if a 
person is released on bail he must be considered to be 
detained in the constructive custody of the court through 
his surety, as his liberty is subject to restraint, and he 
has to be produced before the Court by his surety. Under 
the circumstances his release on bail would not prevent the 
High Court from exercising its power to issue a writ of 
nabeas corpus. 
Refusal of bail does not operate as an estoppel : 
The High Court charged with responsibility of 
safeguarding the liberty of the citizen will be failing in 
its duty if it were to decline to examine the validity of a 
detention on the ground that the person concerned can seek 
relief by means of a bail application. The two reliefs are 
1. Habib Ahmad V. Provincial Govt., A.I.R. 1950 Nag. 161. 
2. Mohd. Zahirul Haque V. State, A.I.R. 1950 M.B. 17. 
3. Mohd. Umar V. Thakur Prasad Tiwari, A.I.R. 1955 M.B. 200 
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entirely different, and even though bail was moved for a 
person it may on scrutiny turn out that the detention is 
illegal. Habeas corpus, cannot be refused on the ground 
that bail petition or its rejection would serve as an 
estoppel. 
(ii) The detention must be illegal or improper 
The word 'illegally' means against law i.e., when 
there is no justification in law for the detention. The 
illegal detention of a subject, that is a detention or 
imprisonment which is incapable of legal justification, is 
the basis of jurisdiction in habeas corpus. This is 
apparant from the very wording of the writ, which requires 
the person named therein who is taken and detained in 
2 
custody, to be produced m Court. If xt is clear that the 
act of Executive is done with the intention of misusing its 
powers,' the courts can deal with the matter on an 
application or a writ of habeas corpus, although the 
custody of the applicant may be technically legal and the 
point is not strictly before the court having regard to the 
form in which the application is made. 
It may be noted in this context that Arts. 20 to 22 
lay down certain constitutional guarantees for the 
protection of the life and personal liberty of every 
individual - Clause (1) of Art. 20 prohibits ex post facto 
1. In re Kunjan Nadar, A.I.R. 19 55 Tr. Co. 74, 
2. Barrardo V. Ford (1892) A.C. 326. 
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laws and Clause (2) bars double prosecution and punishment. 
Art. 21 serves as a restrain upon the executive so that it 
may not proceed against the life and perspnal liberty of a 
subject save under the authority of some law and in 
confirmity with the prodecure laid down therein. 
Article 22 provides certain constitutional limitations upon 
the powers of the Legislature to make any law of procedure 
for depriving a person of his personal liberty. It also 
vests the Legislature with the power to enact a law for 
preventive detention and prescribes the constitutional 
limitation for the validity of such a law. 
The scope and nature of habeas corpus petition does 
not exclude the possibility of a challenge in regard to the 
constitutionality of an Act. In Ram Manohar Lohia V. 
2 
Supdt. Central Prison, Desai, J. observed 'Article 20 
guarantees that a person shall not be deprived of his 
personal liberty except according to procedure established 
by law. The guarantee is broken the moment he is arrested 
for doing an act that is made penal by statute which is 
unconstitutional and the High Court has not only the power, 
but also the duty to issue the writ of habeas corpus, to 
enforce his right to personal liberty. Chaturvedi, J., 
however, held that the validity of an enactment is to be 
judged with reference to the provisions of Article 19 if 
the legislation directly attempts to control a citizen's 
1. In re Kunjan Nadar, A.I.R. 1955 Tr. Co. 74. 
2. A.I.R. 1955 All. 198. 
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freedom of speech. If the freedoms enumerated in Art. 19 
are only restricted indirectly as the result of the 
operation of a legislature authorising punitive or 
preventive detention, then, according to his Lordship, the 
validity of the legislation is not to be judged with the 
reference of Art. 19 but with reference to Articles 20 and 
22 which deal with the subject of detention. 
The detention will be equally illegal where the 
authority passing the order has no jurisdiction under law 
to pass it or where he has not acted within the limitation 
imposed by the statute and conformably to the procedure 
prescribed therein. In the case of Dinanath V. State, an 
order passed by the District Magistrate for detention of a 
person beyond the limits of his territorial jurisdiction 
under Rule 24(1) and (2) of the Jammu & Kashmir Defence 
Rules. Where the order is passed malafide, the detention 
would all the same be illegal. 
The word 'improperly' refers only to those cases in 
which although forms of law have been observed, there has 
been a fraud on an Act or an abuse of the powers given by 
legislature. The expression cannot include any 
consideration of the question whether the legislation in 
2 
question is proper. A person cannot be said to be 
improperly detained unless the judgement convicting him can 
1. Dinanath V. State, A.I.R. 1953, J.&K. 18. 
2. Wasudeo Anant V. Emperor, A.I.R. 1949, Nag. 50 
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be reviewed. Just as is tne case with public custody, so 
is the case with private custody in order to sustain an 
application under Sec. 491, it is necessary that the 
custody of the person detained should be illegal or 
improper when a defendant seeks to be discharged out of 
custody on the ground that the warrant of commitment on 
which he is detained is illegal, he must be brought before 
court by a writ of habeas corpus, although he is too poor 
to bear the expense, as the validity of the warrant will 
not be discussed in his absence. If it appears that the 
act for which the party is committed is no crime or that it 
is a crime, but he is committed for it by a person who has 
no jurisdiction, the court discharges him. It is doubtful 
whether the act is crime or not or whether the party is 
committed by competent jurisdiction, or, if it appears to 
be a crime but a bailable one, the court grants him bails. 
If the offence is not a bailable one and the prisoner is 
committed by a competent jurisdiction, the court remands or 
commits him. 
It is settled law that in habeas corpus proceedings, 
the court is to have regard to the legality or otherwise of 
the detention at the time of the return and not with 
reference to the intimation of the proceedings. The court 
could not be concerned with a date prior to the initiation 
2 
of the proceedings for a writ of habeas corpus. The court 
1. Diwan Singh V. Emperor, A.I.R. 1936, Nag. 132. 
2. Dr. B. Ramchandra Rao V. State of Orissa (1972) 3 Sec 
256. 
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has to consider the legality of the detention on the date 
of the hearing. If on the date of the hearing it cannot be 
said that the aggrieved party has been wrongfully deprived 
of his personal liberty and his detention is contrary to 
law, the writ cannot issued. The object of the writ is to 
afford individual protection to one's liberty and to 
prevent the erosion of the right to be free and move about 
freely. But this right is available only to Indian citizens 
under Art. 19(1) (d). A Pakistani infiltrator if he is 
2 detained under law cannot claim the right to the writ. 
There is no illegal detention if a person is sent to jail 
by a competent court having jurisdiction pending trial or 
when the person is undergoing a sentence of imprisonment. 
It may be stated that the writ of habeas corpus is a 
prerogative writ by which the causes and validity of 
detention of a person are investigated by summery 
procedure. If the authority having his custody does not 
satisfy the court that the deprivation of his personal 
liberty is according to the procedure established by law, 
the person is entitled to his liberty. The order of 
release in the case of a person suspected or charged with 
the commission of an offence does not amount to his 
acquittal or discharge. The authorities are not by virtue 
of his release only on habeas corpus deprived of the power 
1. Latif Hussain V. State of J&K (1971) 3 Sec 112 
2. Anwar V. State of J&K (1971) 3 Sec 104. 
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to arrest and keep him in custody in accordence with law 
the writ proceedings are not designed to interrupt the 
ordinary administration of criminal justice. The Supreme 
Court is bound by the constitutional mandate contained in 
Article 32 read with Article 19(1) (d) and Articles 21 and 
22 of the constitution. If, therefore, a person has been 
deprived of his personal liberty in violation of the 
procedure established by law and no cogent ground for 
declining relief in habeas corpus proceedings is made out, 
then the Supreme Court has no option except to order his 
release, for personal liberty of the individual is highly 
cherished in the Indian constitutional set-up giving 
priority only to the interests of the Nation and the 
security of the state. 
Where a police officer arrests a person without 
warrant for offences under Section 120-B and Section 399, 
I.P.C. (cognizable offences) it is only in accordance with 
procedure established by law within the meaning of Article 
21. When the arrested person challenges the violation of 
his personal liberty by habeas corpus writ, it is for the 
authority who has detained him to establish that the person 
has been detained m the exercise of a valid legal power. 
Similarly detention pursuant to an order of remand under 
Section 344, Cr. P.C. cannot be open to challenge in habeas 
1. Sapinawia v. Dy. Commissioner, Aijal (1970) 2 Sec 399. 
2. K.M. Sundaram V. I.G. of police, Madras (1971) IMLJ 196. 
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corpus. Where there has been inordinate delay of 40 
months for the police to file the charge-sheet under 
Section 359, I.P.C. it was held that it was not a bonafide 
exercise of power by the police and that such continued 
imprisonment without trial was a good ground for discharge 
2 
by the High Court in habeas corpus proceedings. 
The Cases under Preventive Detention Act 
In matters of preventive detention, the detenu is 
entitled to be set free even if one ground is vague within 
3 
the meaning of Article 22(5) read with Clause (6). It is 
now the law as laid by the Supreme Court in Rabindranath 
4 
Bose V. Union of India that laches over an unreasonable 
time will defeat the right to move the Supreme Court under 
Art. 32. The Supreme Court set at liberty the petitioner 
detained under Section 3(i)(2) of the Maintenance of 
Internal Security Act of 1971. The Court lamented that the 
use of the word 'or' in the order indicates that the 
District Magistrate was not sure in his mind about the 
precise ground for detaining the petitioner and that he had 
mechanically reproduced the language used in 
Section (3)(a)(ii) of the Act. Even where the habeas 
corpus petition was dismissed by a High Court under 
1. A. Lakshmanarao V. Judicial Magistrate, Parvatiouram 
(1970) 3 Sec 501. 
2. Krishna Bahadur V. State A.I.R. 1971 Patna 237. 
3. Pushkar Mukherjee V. State of W.B., A.I.R. 1970 Sc 786 
4. A.I.R. 1970 Sc 470. 
5. Akshov Konai V. State of W.B., A.I.R. 1973, Sc 300. 
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Article 226, there is no bar to move the Supreme Court 
under Article 32 where the court is enjoined to protect the 
citizens of his liberty under Article 19. It was also 
laid down that where there inordinate delay in comunicating 
the grounds of detention the petitioner is entitled for 
release. 
The position of writ of Habeas Corpus during the Emergency 
of 1975-77 
In a democratic country, the rights and liberties of 
an individual are as important as the power of the state to 
regulate them in the interest of society; and a balance is 
maintained between them with the help of the judiciary. 
However, the maintenance of civil liberties becomes a 
complex issue in times of national energency. There can be 
no debate that, in a national crisis, social interest has 
precedence over individual liberty. Since civil liberties 
rest on the continuance of the state as a Sovereign body, 
preservation of the state against threats, internal or 
external, to its existence, has the top most priority and 
cannot be ignored even in the name of civil liberties. On 
the contrary, when a war or internal disorder threatens the 
state, the interests of the individual and those of society 
become identical and the individual is expected to 
surrender his liberties to the extent it is necessary in 
1. Niranjan Singh V. State of M.P., (1972) 2 Sec 542. 
49 
the interests of the state. Therefore, the real question 
is not whether an amergency justifies the total or partial 
suspension of civil liberties, for civil liberties by their 
very nature cannot be absolute even in peace time and 
certain restrictions have to imposed for the common good. 
The basic questions are: To what extent should the state 
limit human right and fundamental freedoms which are so 
basic to existence that even the consideration of security 
of the state cannot be permitted to supress them? 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights provides that states may depart from their 
obligations when an emergency 'threatens the life of the 
nation,' but 'only to the extent strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation.' Moreoever, says the 
covenant, the measures taken must not be 'inconsistent with 
their other obligations under international law.' Article 
4(2). of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights goes on to provide that the government under its 
emergency powers, must not arbitrarily deprive an 
individual of life; subject him to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment; hold him in slavery; 
imprison him for inability to fulfil a contractual 
obligation; subject him to retroactive penal laws; and deny 
him the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion. 
1. Article 4(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. ' ~~ ' 
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In India, the fundamental rights of people have been 
on occasions, under heavy strain. From Gopalan's to Makhan 
1 2 . . 
Singh's and from Golak Nath's history - making case to 
3 
Kesavananda Bharti , the basic issue has been the place of 
fundamental rights in India's Constitution. But in the 
4 
epoch-making case of A.D.M. Jabalpur V. Shivakant Shukla, 
popularly known as the Habeas Corpus case, the very life 
and liberty of the nation were sacrificed at the alter of 
the rule of law. At a time when the High Courts upheld 
personal liberty against heavy odds, the Supreme Court 
displayed little enthusiasm for it. In the Habeas Corpus 
case, the court was called upon to consider the validity of 
detentions made during the emergency of 1975-77. The 
question before it was whether, in view of the Presidential 
Order dated 27 June 1975 issued under Clause (1) of Article 
359 of the Constitution,a petition under Article 226 before 
a High Court for a writ of habeas corpus to enforce the 
right of personal liberty of a person detained under the 
Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA), 1971, was 
maintainable. The court had to decide the question at a 
time when the whole policy of preventive detention was 
immunised from judicial review. Not only the courts could 
not be moved for the protection of fundamental rights 
1. Makhan Singh V. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1964 Sc 381. 
2. I.e. Golak Nath & others V. State of Punjab, A.I.R.,1967 
Sc 1643. 
3. Kesavananda Bharti V. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 Sc 
1461. • 
4. A.D.M. Jabalpur V. Shivakant Shukla, A.I.R. 1976 Sc 1207 
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because of a Presidential order to this effect, but the 
statute under which these detentions were made i.e. the 
Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, also was placed 
in the Nineth Schedule of the Constitution which immunised 
it from challenge on the grounds that it violated the major 
fundamental rights. 
Several detenus under MISA, 1971, had filed in 
different High Courts petitions for the issue of the writ 
of habeas corpus, praying for their release from preventive 
detention. The petitioners challenged the legality and 
validity of the orders of their datention. Nine High 
2 . . 
Courts of the country held that though the petitioners 
could not move the Court to enforce their fundamental 
rights under Article 21, it was open to them to challenge 
their detention on the ground that it was ultra vires i.e. 
by showing that the detention order ex-facie was passed by 
an authority not empowered to pass it, or it was in excess 
of the powers delegated to the authority, or the power had 
been exercised in breach of the conditions prescribed in 
that behalf by the Detention Act, or the order was not in 
strict conformity with the provisions of the said Act 
despite the Presidential order dated 27 June 1975, issued 
under Article 359(1) of the constitution. 
In reaction to the above findings of the High Courts, 
several state governments and the Union Government filed 
1. Constitution of India. 
2. The High Courts of Allahabad, Andhra Pradesh, Bombay, 
Delhi, Karnataka, Madras, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab and 
Haryana. 
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appeals in the Supreme court. They argued that, since the 
Presidential order under Article 359 of the constitution 
had suspended the enforcement of fundamental rights 
enumerated in Articles 14, 19, 21 and 22, the detenus had 
no locus standi to move any court for habeas corpus or for 
any other writ. The state and Union Governments pleaded 
that, under Section 16A of MISA, they were not obliged to 
disclose the grounds of detention; therefore the courts 
could not go into the reasons for detention and must accept 
ex-facie the subjective satisfaction of the detaining 
authority as recorded in the detention order. 
On the other hand, it was argued on behalf of the 
detenus that (1) the rule of law prevailed even during the 
emergency and the executive must respect it; (ii) the 
emergency did not empower passing orders ultra vires of 
MISA; (iii) the Presidential order could bar the 
enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 32 but 
other rights could be enforced under Article 226 which 
permitted admission of petitions 'for any other purpose', 
so that common law rights and other statutory rights could 
be enforced through writs; (iv) Article 21 was not the sole 
repository of the right to life and liberty, for the 
citi'zen had such a right even before the promulgation of 
the constitution and it cannot be said to have been lost on 
the incorporation of Article 21 into the Constitution; and 
(v) the enquiry for determining the vires of the order or 
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its benafides was not closed during an emergency. But the 
majority of judges rejected the above contentions and held 
that, in view of the Presidential order dated 27 June, 1975 
under clause (1) of Article 359 of the constitution, no 
person had any locus standi to move any writ petition under 
Article 226 before a High Court or any other court, 
including the Supreme Court, under Article 32, for habeas 
corpus or any other writ or order or direction to challenge 
the legality of an order of detention on the ground that 
the order was not under or in compliance with the Act 
(MISA) or was vitiated by malafides, factual or legal, or 
was based on extraneous consideration. 
According to the majority view, the Presidential Order 
had completely suspended the rule of law during the 
emergency and the citizen was put at the mercy of the 
state, for even his democratic right to protection against 
the whims of the executive authority was denied to him. 
What was most disturbing was that the court held that even 
a prima-facie malafide order of detention could not be 
quashed in a writ of habeas corpus. Such a view had never 
been taken either in Britain or the USA or even in British 
India. In India, during the emergency, judicial review of 
executive action was totally bassed and a petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus was not maintainable. As a result 
1. The concurring opinion of A.N. Roy, C.J.; M.H. Beg, Y.V. 
Chandrachud, P.N. Bhagwati, J.J. constituted the 
majority decisions with Khanna, J. dissenting. 
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of the decision of the Supreme Court in the Habeas Corpus 
case, thousands of petitions pending before the High Courts 
were dismissed summarily without going into the merits of 
each case. 
In the Habeas Corpus case nine High Courts relied 
heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Makhan Singh 
wherein it was held that the writ of habeas corpus could 
not be denied if the detention order was in manifest breach 
of the relevant detention law. The questions before the 
2 
special bench of seven judges of the Supreme court in 
Makhan Singh were: what was the true scope and effect of 
the Presidential Order issued under Article 359(1)? 
Interpreting Article 359 of the Constitution, the bench 
observed that a petition for the issue of a writ of habeas 
corpus on the ground that the order of detention was 
violative of the law under which it was sought to be made 
or was malafide, was outside the' purview of Article 359. 
The effect of the decision was that a detenu could by a 
writ of habeas corpus challenge an order of detention on 
diverse grounds of malafide, excessive delegation or 
violation of the mandatory provision of the relevent state, 
the Presidential order under Art. 359(1) not withstanding. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court bench of five judges in the 
Habeas Corpus case had no constitutional authority to 
overside the decision of the seven-member bench in Makhan 
1. Makhan Singh V. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1964 Sc 381. 
2. The bench in Makhan Singh consisted of P.B. Gajendra-
gadkar, A.K. Sarkar, K. Subba Rao, K.N. Wanchoo, M. 
Hidayatullah, K.C. Dasyupta and u.C. Shah, J.J. 
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Singh's case. 
The decision in Makhan Singh was, however, 
distinguished by the court on the ground that the language 
of the Presidential Order was different from that of 
similar orders which were inforce at that time and the 
decision in Makhan Singh was therefore not to be applied. 
Under the earlier orders, the right of a person to move a 
court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by 
Articles 14, 21 and 22 of the constitution, was suspended 
only if such a person had been deprived of any such rights 
under the Defence of India Ordinance, 1962, or rule or any 
order made thereunder. There was no such qualification in 
the Presidential Order issued in 1975 and, therefore, it 
was interpreted that the constitutional rights remained 
suspended even if the person concerned was deprived of such 
rights without the authority of any law whatsoever. This 
proposition appeared to be startling to many and judgement 
was received with great concern. The decision gave a free 
hand to the executive to interfere with the life and 
liberty of persons at its own free will. It was a classic 
case of judicial self-abnegation, for the court did not 
assert its authority to uphold personal liberties. 
Subsequently, the Forty-second Amendment Act, 1976, 
crippled the judiciary further by circumscribing the 
jurisdiction of the courts to review the exercise of power 
1. H.M. Seervi, M.C. Chagla, V.M, Tarkunde, L.M. Singhvi, 
etc. 
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by the executive and the lagislature and by altering the 
procedure of judicial decision-making. Judicial review and 
the whole gamut of judicial process were in jeopardy. 
Soon after the revocation of emergency, the decision 
taken in the habeas corpus case was severely criticised. 
•The Habeas Corpus Case', observes H.M. Seevai, is the most 
glaring instance in which the Supreme Court of India has 
suffered most severely from a self-inflicted wound'. It 
is debatable whether the interpretation of the provisions 
of the constitution and the Presidential Order given in the 
Habeas Corpus case was inevilable, or the adoption of a 
more humane interpretation keeping in mind the fundamental 
interests of society, was impossible. It is unfortunate 
that, in interpreting the provisions of the MISA as amended 
by the Presidential Ordinance, the judges protected the 
executive action and appear to have been more mindful of 
the language of law than its spirit. 
The rationality and justice of the Habeas Corpus 
decision can least be debated, but such a debate is not 
even possible on the less known but outrageous decision of 
2 
the court in Union of India V. Bhanudas m which the 
Supreme Court of India was called upon to define the extent 
and scope of personal liberty during the days of internal 
emergency. The petitioners who were detained under 
1. H.M. Seervi, The Emergency, Future Safeguards and the 
Habeas corpus casei AcrlLiuibiu (Bumbdy: 
Tripathi, 1978), p. 59. 
2. A.I.R. 1977 S.c. 1027. The bench consisted of A.N. Ray 
C.J.; M.H. Beg and Jaswant Singh, JJ. • J ' / 
57 
Section 3 of the conservation of Foreign Exchange and 
Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act (COFEPOSA), 1974, 
complained against certain contraints imposed on them and 
claimed certain facilities in jail during the period of 
their detention. The court denied the relief and totally 
reversed the decision of Bombay and Karnataka High Courts 
which had given certain facilities to the detenus. Relying 
on its decision in Gopalan , A.D.M. Jabalpur V. Shivakant 
Shukla , it held that all the rights that constituted 
personal liberty under Article 19, 21 and 22 were suspended 
during the operation of emergency and that the COFEPOSA and 
the orders passed thereunder were not open to challenge on 
the ground of their being inconsistent with or repugnant to 
Articles 14, 19, 21 and 22 of the constitution, in view of 
the Presidential Orders of 27 June 1975 and 8 January 1976, 
which totally took away the locus standi of the detenus to 
move any court for the enforcement of the aforesaid rights. 
The court reiterated the majority view in the Habeas Corpus 
case, that the Presidential Order imposed a blanket ban on 
every judicial enquiry into the validity of an order 
depriving a person of his personal liberty, no matter 
whether it stammed from the initial order directing his 
detention or from an order laying down the conditions of 
his detention. 
1. A.I.R. 1950 B.C. 88. 
2. A.I.R. 1976, Sc. 1207 
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The decision of the court in the above case authorised 
the state to do what it pleased with the detenus, for it 
disallowed complaints against illegal or unreasonable 
conditions of detention. The court accepted the 
contention of the Union of India that what was not 
permitted by the detention legislation was prohibited by 
it, overlooking its own approach in State of Maharastra V. 
2 
Prabhakar Pandurang in which this plea was rejected by 
saying that, if it were to be accepted, 'it would mean that 
the detenu could be starved to death, if there was no 
provision for giving food to the detenus.' Despite this 
categorical pronouncement in Prabhakar, the court held in 
Bhanudas that Prabhakar was an authority for the 
proposition that, as a detenu was no longer a freeman, he 
could exercise only such privilages as were conferred on 
him by the order of detention or by rules governing his 
detention. 
After the withdrawal of internal emergency, the 
Supreme Court realised the serious consequences of its 
pronouncements. The erosion of personal liberties was 
checked by the Forty-Fourth Constitutional Amendment Act, 
1978, enacted by the Janta Government. The Act sought to 
restore writs like habeas corpus and judicial review. The 
1. Union of India V. Bhanudas Krishna Gawde and others etc. 
A.I.R., 1977 S.C. 1044. 
2. The State of Maharastra V. Prabhakar Pandurang Sanzgiri, 
A^.R., 1966, S.C. 424. 
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court eagerly grasped this opportunity to rehabilitate 
itself and began to rebuild its prestige and power. In a 
series of decisions culmirating in Maneka Gandhi, it tried 
to raise judicial review to a conscious, creative and civil 
libertarian activism. The court acquired a clear 
antiauthoritarian role that helped revive the confidence of 
people in the judicial process and its avowed goal of 
social justice and protection of basic freedoms. It was in 
this context that the Supreme Court was motivated to give a 
liberal interpretation in several cases after the internal 
emergency. 
C H A P T E R - I I I 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF HABEAS CORPUS 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF HABEAS CORPUS 
Article 32 constitutes the heart and soul of the 
Constitution as it provides remedies for the enforcement of 
fundamental rights. Rights are meaningless without an 
effective machinary to guard against legislative Venture 
someness or executive arbitariness. It is the remedy which 
makes that right real. If there is no remedy there is no 
right at all. It was, therefore, in the fitness of the 
things that our Constitution-makers having incorporated a 
long list of fundamental rights have also provided for an 
effective remedy for the enforcement of these rights under 
Article 32 of the constitution. Article 32 is itself a 
fundamental rights. Article 32 is supreme and is not 
subject to legislative control as far as Habeas Corpus is 
concerned. Article 32(1) guarantees the right to move the 
Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the 
enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III of the 
constitution. Clause (2) of Art. 32 confers power on the 
Supreme Court to issue appropriate direction or order or 
writs, including writ in the nature of habeas corpus for 
the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III 
of the Constitution. Under clause (3) of Article 32, 
Parliament may be law empower any other court to exercise 
within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of 
the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under 
Clause (2). 
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Under Article 32(1) the Supreme Court's power to 
enforce fundamental right is widest. There is no premium 
in regard to the proceedings envisaged in clause (1) except 
that the proceeding must be appropriate. The constitution-
makers deliberately did not lay down any particular form of 
proceeding for enforcement of fundamental right nor did 
they stipulate any rigid pattern or a straitjacket formula 
because they knew that in a country like India born and 
bred in a pluralist society of inequality and injustice and 
in environs of class polarities and paradoxes, any 
insistance on a rigid formula of proceeding for enforcement 
of fundamental sight would become self-defeating. 
It should, however, be pointed out that the right to 
move the Supreme Court is available only to those whose 
fundamental rights are infringed . The power vested in the 
Supreme Court can only be invoked for the enforcement of 
2 
the fundamental right . Hence, the Supreme Court cannot 
order the release of a person from detention on a writ of 
habeas corpus until it is satisfied that the petitioner's 
detention is really unwarranted by law. This means that in 
case of detention under the MISA 1971, the petitioner has 
to show a violation of either Article 21 or Art. 22 of the 
Constitution. It he fails'to show that he had been denied 
the protection of these Articles he cannot seek the remedy 
1. In the Matter of Madhu Limaya, A.I.R.,1969 Sc. 1014. 
2. Romesh Tapper V. State of Madras, A.I.R., 1950 Sc. 124. 
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provided in Article 32. 
(A) Who can apply the writ of Habeas Corpus 
The traditional view is that a petition under Article 
32 can only be filed by a person whose fundamental right is 
infringed. Recently, however, the Supreme Court has 
relaxed the traditional rule regarding the locus standi 
considerably. Thus, any one on behalf of the detenu can 
apply for a writ of habeas corpus. The court has permitted 
public interest litigations at the instance of public 
spirited citizens for the enforcement of constitutional and 
legal rights of others who, because of their poverty or 
other reasons, are unable to approach the court. With the 
increase in the duties and obligations of the state towards 
the people in view of its commitment to an egalitarian 
society, the courts cannot remain document. An active role 
in defence of public interest is an imperative. It is no 
longer enough for the judiciary to protect private legal 
rights, and it is necessary for it to relax the principles 
locus standi to meet the growing aspirations of the 
bewildered masses. 
The right to move the courts for the violation of 
personal rights has been long recognised. But the 
traditional rule of locus standi for judicial remedy is 
restricted to only that person who has suffered or is 
1. Ram Bali V. State of W.B., A.I.R., 1975, Sc. 623, 
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likely to suffer an injury to his body, mind or reputation 
on account of the violation of his legal right or legally 
protected interest by the impunged action of the state or 
some public authority . Two types of persons qualify for 
judicial relief: those who are 'aggrieved' in terms of the 
definition of the word given in the various statutes; and 
those who move the High Courts under Article 226 or the 
S_upreme Court under Article 32. Usually, in both the cases 
the person has to show that he has suffered some loss or 
injury; in case of an alleged violation of a right, he 
must, in addition, prove that he has the right. In any 
case, he cannot assail a legislative or an administrative 
action on the ground that a third person's right is 
infringed . The traditional rule of locus standi was based 
on the belief that judicial time as well as energy ought 
not be wasted over hypothetical or abstract questions or at 
the instance of professional litigants. The idea is summed 
up by S.A. de Smith in these words: 'All developed legal 
systems have had to face the problem of adjusting conflicts 
between two aspects of the public interest the desirability 
of encouraging individual citizens to participate actively 
in the enforcement of the law, and the undesirability of 
encouraging the professional litigant and the meddlesome 
interloper to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts in 
1. S.P. Gupta and others V. Union of India, A.I.R., 1982, 
S.c. 149. 
2. v.S. Deshpande, 'Standing Justiciability', Journal of 
the Indian Law Institute, Vol. 13, No. 2, April-June 
1971, p. 153. 
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matters that do not concern him.' . 
In India, excepting the writ of habeas corpus, locus 
standi was accorded only to that person where personal 
2 
right was violated. In Desai , Justice Sarkana quoted a 
number of decisions of the Supreme Court to that effect. 
But, in the recent cases, this emphasis on the violation of 
personal right has been given up. In view of the peculiar 
socio-economic conditions in the country, the courts have 
in the last couple of years begun to extend locus standi to 
the greatest possible extent. They have liberalised the 
traditional, rules of standing and have recognised that, in 
certain circumstances, the direct victim may not be in a 
position to move them and so in such cases a third party 
must be given an opportunity to bring the facts to their 
attention, even when the party is not the direct victim of 
the impugned action or event. Such a provision is 
absolutely essential for maintaining the rule of law 
furthering the cause of justice and accelerating the peace 
of realisation of the constitutional objectives. 
Generally habeas corpus is moved by the person 
detained or in custody. But courts must not refuse to act 
on a stranger's application which brings home to the court 
the illegality of the detention. Courts can act Suo motu 
1. S.A. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 
4th ed. by J.M. Evans (London: Stevens and Sons Ltd., 
1980), p. 409. 
2. Jasbhai Motibhai Desai V. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir 
Ahmad and others, A.I.R., 1976, SC. 578. 
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in the interests of justice, on any information conveyed to 
it by anyone. It is well settled that a person illegally 
imprisoned or detained in confinement without legal 
proceedings is entitled to seek the remedy of habeas 
corpus. But it is not necessary that the detenu should 
alone apply. Any interested person may initiate 
proceedings on his behalf. In the Hussainara Khatoon , a 
writ petition was filed by a Supreme Court advocate, 
Mrs. Kapila Hingorani, on the behalf of the undertrial 
prisoners languishing in the Bihar jails, on the basis of a 
2 
series of articles in the Indian Express. Kadra Pehadiya 
too, was taken-up on the basis of a letter from a social 
worker to one of the judges of the Supreme Court, and the 
case resulted in the trial of the tribal undertrials 
languishing in jail for a long time. The letter which 
disclosed that four undertrial prisoners lodged in the 
Pakud Sub-jail in Bihar were put in view-fetters was 
metamorphosed into a writ petition and was registered in 
the names of the undertrial prisoners. The Supreme Court 
directed the prison authorities to remove the iron fetters 
and desist from putting them on work outside the jail 
compound. It directed the Sessions Judge to expedite the 
trial and the state gove'rnment, to supply a list of the 
1. Hussainara Khatoon and others V. Home Secretary, State 
of Bihar, A.I.R., 1979, S.C. 1360, 1369, 1377, 1819 
(I to IV). 
2, Kadra Pehadiya and others V. State of Bihar, A.I R , 
1981 S.C. 939. 
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undertrial prioners. In Sant Bir which was brought before 
the Supreme Court by the Free Legal Aid Committee, the 
Court condemned the detention of a person in jail for over 
sixteen years without the authority of law and ordered his 
release. Thus, the judgement in Hussainara and Veena 
Sethi have shown that any interested person can initiate 
the writ of Habeas Corpus on the behalf of a detenu. In 
Hussainara Khatoon, P.N. Bhagwati and D.A. Desai J.J. in 
their judgement observed, we find from the lists of 
undertrial prisoners filed before us on behalf of the State 
of Bihar that the undertrial prisoners whose names are set 
out in the chart filed by Mrs. Hingorani today have been in 
jail for periods longer than the maximum term for which 
they could have been sentenced, if convicted. This 
discloses a shocking state of affairs and betrays complete 
lack of concern for human values. It exposes the 
callousness of our legal and judicial system which can 
remain unmoved by such enormous misery and suffering 
resulting from totally unjustified deprivation of personal 
liberty. It is indeed difficult for us to understand how 
the State Government could possibly remain oblivious to the 
continued incarceration of the under-trial prisoners for 
years without even their trial having commenced. The 
judiciary in the State of of Bihar also cannot escape its 
1. Sant Bir V. State of Bihar, A.I.R., 1982, S.C. 1470. 
2. Veena Sethi V. State of Bihar and others, A.I.R. 1983, 
S.C. 339. 
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share of blame because it would not have been unaware of 
the fact that thousands of under-trial prisoners are 
languishing in jail awaiting trial which never seems to 
coitunence. We fail to see how the continued detention of 
these under-trial prisoners mentioned in the list of 
Mrs. Hingorani can be justified when we find that they have 
already been in jail for a period longer than what they 
would have been sentenced to suffer, if convicted. They 
have in fact some jail term of their credit. We, 
therefore, direct that these under-trial prisoners whose 
names and particulars are given in the list filed by 
Mrs. Hingorani should be released forthwith as continuance 
of their detention is clearly illegal and in voilation of 
their fundamental right under Article 21 of the 
Constitution. 
Then there are several under-trial prisoners who are 
charged with offences which are bailable but who are still 
in jail presumably because no application for bail has been 
made on their behalf or being too poor they are unable to 
furnish bail. It is not uncommon to find that under-trial 
prisoners who are produced before the Magistrates are 
unaware of their right to obtain release on bail and on 
account of their poverty, they are unable to engage a 
lawyer who would apprise them of their right to apply for 
bail and help them to secure release on bail by making a 
proper application to the Magistrate in that behalf. 
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Sometimes the Magistrates also refuse to release the 
under-trial prisoners produced before them on their 
personal bond but insist on monetary bail with sureties, 
which by reason of their poverty the under-trial prisoners 
are unable to furnish and which, therefore, effectively 
shuts out for them any possibility of release from pretrial 
detention. This unfortunate situation cries aloud for 
introduction of an adequate and comprehensive legal service 
programme, but so far, these cries do not seem to have 
revoked any response. We do not think it is possible to 
reach the benefits of the legal process to the poor, to 
protect them against injustice and to secure to them their 
constitutional and statutory rights unless there is a 
nationwide legal service programme to provide free legal 
services to them. It is now well settled, as a result of 
the decision of this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of 
India, (1978) 1 SCC 248: (AIR 1978 SC 597) that when 
Article 21 provides that no person shall be deprived of his 
life or liberty except in accordance with the procedure 
established by law, it is not enough that there should be 
some semblance of procedure provided by law, but the 
procedure under which a person may be deprived of his life 
or liberty should be ' re-asonable, fair and just'. Now, a 
procedure which does not make available legal services to 
an accused person who is too poor to afford a lawyer and 
who would, therefore, have to go through the trial without 
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legal assistance, cannot possibly be regarded as 
'reasonable, fair and just'. It is an essential ingredient 
of reasonable, fair and just procedure to a prisoner who is 
to seek his liberation through the court's process that he 
should have legal services available to him. This Court 
pointed out in M.H. Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra, (1978) 
3 sec 544: AIR 1978 SC 1548): "Judicial justice, with 
procedural intricacies, legal submissions and critical 
examination of evidence, leans upon professional expertise; 
and a failure of equal justice under the law is on the 
cards where such supportive skill is absent for one side. 
Our judicature, moulded by Anglo-American models and our 
judicial process, engineered by kindred legal technology, 
compel the collaboration of lawyer - power for steering the 
wheels of equal justice under the law'. Free legal 
services to the poor and the needy is an essential element 
of any 'reasonable, fair' and just' procedure. It is not 
necessary to quote authoritative pronouncements by judges 
and jurists in support of the view that without the service 
of a lawyer an accused person would be denied 'reasonable, 
fair and just' procedure. Black, J., observed in Gideon v. 
Wainwright, (1963) 372 US 335: 9 L Ed 2d 799: 
'Not only these precedents but also reason and 
reflection require us' to recognise that in our adversary 
system of criminal justice, any person held into court, who 
.is too poor to hire a lawyer cannot be assured a fair trial 
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unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be 
an obvious truth. Governments, both State and Federal 
quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish 
machinery to try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to 
prosecute are everywhere deemed essential to protect the 
public's interest in an orderly society. Similarly, there 
are few defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail 
to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and 
present their defences. That Government hires lawyers to 
prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to 
defend are the strongest indications of the widespread 
belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not 
luxuries. The right of one charged with crime to counsel 
may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials 
in some countries, but is in ours. From the very beginning 
our State and national constitutions and laws have laid 
great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards 
designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals 
in which every defendant stands equal before the law. This 
.noble ideal cannot be realised if poor man charged with 
crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist 
him. ' 
The philosophy of free legal service as an essential 
element of fair procedure is also to be found in the 
following passage from the judgement of Douglas, J. in Jon 
Richard Argersinger v. Raymond Hamlin, (1972) 407 US 25: 
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32 L Ed 2d 530 at pp. 535-36: 
'The right to be heard would be, in many cases of 
little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard 
by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has 
small and sometimes no skill in the since of law. If 
charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of 
determining for himself whether the indictment is good or 
bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left 
without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a 
proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or 
evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. 
He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare 
his defence, even though he has a perfect one. He requires 
the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the 
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not 
guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does 
not know how to establish his innocence. It that be true 
of men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the 
ignorant and illiterate or those of feeble intellect. 
The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not 
be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some 
countries but it is in ours. From the very beginning our 
State and national constitutions and laws have laid great 
emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed 
to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which 
every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble 
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ideal cannot be realised if the poor man charged with crime 
has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him. 
The court should consider the probable sentence that 
will follow if a conviction is obtained. The more serious 
the likely consequences, the greater is the probability 
that a lawyer should be appointed The court should 
consider the individual factors peculiar to each case. 
These, of course would be the most difficult to anticipate. 
One relevant factor would be the competency of the 
individual defendant to present his own case, (emphasis 
added)' 
We may also refer to Article 39-A the fundamental 
constitutional directive which reads as follows:-
'39-A. Equal justice and free legal aid:- The State 
shall secure that the operation of the legal system 
promotes justice, on a basis of equal opportunity, and 
shall, in particular, provide free legal aid, by suitable 
legislation or schemes or in any other way, to ensure that 
opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any 
citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities, 
(emphasis added).' 
This Article also emphasises that free legal service is an 
unalienable element of 'reasonable, fair and just' 
procedure for without it a person suffering from economic 
or other disabilities would be deprived of the opportunity 
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for securing justice. The right to free legal services is, 
therefore, clearly an essential ingredient of 'reasonable, 
fair and just' procedure for a person accused of an offence 
and it must be held implicit in the guarantee of Article 21 
This is a constitutional right of every accused person who 
is unable to engage a lawyer and secure legal services on 
account of reasons such as poverty, indigence or 
incommunicado situation and the State is under a mandate to 
provide a lawyer to an accused person if the circumstances 
to the case and the needs of justice so required, provided 
of course the accused person does not object to the 
provision of such lawyer. We would, therefore, direct that 
on the next remand dates, when the under-trial prisoners, 
charged with bailable offences, are produced before the 
Magistrates, the State Government should provide them a 
lawyer at its own cost for the purpose of making an 
application for bail, provided that no objection is raised 
to such lawyer on behalf of such under-trial prisoners and 
if any application for bail' is made, the Magistrates should 
dispose of the same in accordance with the broad outlines 
set out by us in our judgement dated 12th February, 1979. 
The State Government will report to the High Court of Pains 
its compliance with this direction within a period of six 
weeks from today. 
We may also take this opportunity of impressing upon 
the Government of India as also the State Governments, the 
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urgent necessity of introducing a dynamic and comprehensive 
legal service programme with a view to reaching justice to 
the common man. Today, unfortunately, in our country the 
poor are priced out of the judicial system with the result 
that they are losing faith in the capacity of our legal 
system to bring about changes in their life conditions and 
to deliver justice to them. The poor in their contact with 
the legal system have always been on the wrong side of the 
line. They have always come across 'law for the poor' 
rather than law of the poor'. The law is regarded by them 
as something mysterious and forbidding - always taking 
something away from them and not as a positive and 
constructive social device for changing the social economic 
order and improving their life conditions by conferring 
rights and benefits on them. The result is that the legal 
system has lost its credibility for the weaker sections of 
the community. It is, therefore, necessary that we should 
inject equal justice into legality and that can be done 
only by dynamic and activist scheme of legal services. 
In order to maintain a petition for habeas corpus, 
physical confinement is not necessary. It is sufficient if 
some kind of control, custody or restraint is exercised 
over the person. The scope of the prisoner's rights and 
the role of the courts in protecting those rights were 
extensively dealt with by the Supreme Court in Sunil 
Batra . A writ petition was filed by Sunil Batra, a 
1. Sunil Batra V. Delhi Administration II, AIR 1980 SC 1579 
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prisoner in Tihar Jail against the Jail Warden's brutal 
assault on another prisoner, Premchand on 29 December 1979, 
the Supreme Court in a judgement of far reaching importance 
in what is known as the Delhi Torture Case suggested prison 
reforms. It struck down handcuffing of undertrials except 
as a last resort and for reasons recorded in writing, the 
chief among which was the undesirable possibility of the 
prisoner's escaping from the custody of the jail 
authorities. On the question of the under-trials being 
kept along with the convicts, the court disapproved of the 
practice on the plea that the undertrials were presumably 
innocent until convicted and that the practice amounted to 
custodial perversity which violated the test of reasonable-
ness in Article 21. Besides, the court ordered that no 
solitary or punitive confinement in a cell, harsh labour, 
other degrading punishments or denial of privilages and 
amenities, and transfer to other prisons with panel 
consequences, shall be imposed on the prisoner without the 
appraisal of the Session Judge. Where it was difficult to 
seek the permission of the Sessions Judge in this behalf, 
intimation shall be given to him within two days of the 
action. Further, to make the prisoners' rights in 
correctional institutions viable, the court ordered that 
the District Magistrates and the Session Judges shall 
personally or through surrogates visit the prisons in their 
jurisdiction and afford effective opportunities for the 
redressal of prisoners' grievances. 
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The Supreme Court has consistently shown great anxiety 
for personal liberty and refused to throw out a petition 
merely on the ground that it does not disclose a prima 
facie case. This practice marks a departure from that 
obtaining in England where observance of the strict rules 
of pleading in insisted upon in a writ of habeas corpus. 
But in view of the peculiar socio-economic conditions 
prevailing in this country the court has adopted a liberal 
approach. Where a large masses of people are poor, 
illiterate and ignorant and the access to the courts is not 
easy on account of lack of financial resources it would be 
most unreasonable to insist that the petitioner should set 
out clearly and specifically the grounds on which he 
challenges the order of detention. The burden of proof to 
justify detention has always be placed on the detaining 
authority. 
-r -r , „ -1, the Supreme Court held in case of a In lechu Devi 
writ of habeas corpus that the court does not, as a matter 
of practice, follow strict rules of pleadings nor does it 
place undue emphasis on the strict observance of the rules 
of burden of proof. Even a post-card by any pro bono 
publico is sufficient to activise the court into examining 
thelegality of detention. It is sufficient if a judge is 
satisfied that there is a violation of fundamental right. 
Technicalities and legal necessities are no impediment 
1. Icchu Devi V. Union of India, AIR, 1980, S.C. 1981 
to the court entertaining even an inform"§5^ =vowafiuTu.cation as 
a proceeding for habeas corpus if the basic feets are 
found. The writ of habeas corpus cannot only be used for 
releasing a person illegally detained but it will be also 
used for protecting him from inhuman treatment inside 
jails. The Supreme Court took a big stride forward on the 
issue of prison reform in Sunil Batra . In its judgement 
on the writ petition filed by two prisoners confined in the 
Tihar Jail, Sunil Batra and Charles Sobraj, the court 
examined the constitutionality of Solitary confinement as 
well as of putting the undertrial prisoner in bar-fetters. 
The case involved two petitions challenging the 
constitutional validity of Section 30(2) and 56 of the 
Prison Act 1894. The first petition was filed by one Sunil 
Batra who had been sentenced to death by the District and 
Sessions Judge. Batra complained that, since 6 July 1976, 
when he was sentenced to death, he had been kept in 
solitary confinement till the Supreme Court intervened by 
an interim order on 24 February 1978. In the other 
petition, Charles Sobraj, a foreigner charged with serious 
offences, complained that he had been kept in bar-fitters 
ever since he was loged in Tihar Jail. 
Batra highlighted the saga of unauthorised practices 
prevail in the Indian jails and lamented on the plight of 
1. Sunil Batra V. Delhi Administration and others (1), AIR, 
1978 SC. 1675. 
The bench consisted of Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J.; V.R. 
Krishna Iyer; S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, P.N. SinahSil and 
D.A. Desai, JJ. ^ 
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prisoners. For the first time in history of the court, the 
Chief Justice of India, M.H. Beg, and Justices Krishna Iyer 
and Kailasam visited the Tihar Jail on 23 January 1978 to 
ascertain the actual conditions, and the memorandum 
prepared by the Chief Justice served as a basis for 
discussion in the court. Another unique feature of the 
case was that the court permitted the citizens for 
Democracy a voluntary group concerned with human rights, to 
formally intervene in the case, in addition to accepting 
the individual amicus curial briefs. In Sunil Batra, the 
court took serious note of the practice of solitary 
confinement of prisoners for an indefinite period. Section 
30(2) of the Prisons Act stipulates that a prisoner 
condemned to death is to be confined to a cell away from 
other prisoners and to place him under the charge of a 
guard. The court interpreted the crucial words 'under 
sentence of death' in Section 30(2) to mean that a prisoner 
was not under sentence of death till he exhausts all 
avenues, appeal and petitions for mercy are exhausted. 
Such a prisoner shall not be denied normal amenities. The 
court held that even after the confirmation of death 
penalty Section 30(2) only requires that the convict be 
lodged a separate cell which does not mean solitary 
confinement alone. Such prisoners were not to be 
'completely segregated except in extreme cases of 
necessity.' They could be kept apart from other prisoners 
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but could not be given Solitary Confinement in the sense of 
cellular confinement, depriving them of all human 
communication and fellowship, which was the 'hardcore' 
implication of 'Solitary'. In the case, the court opposed 
solitary confinement because it was 'gruesome', 'revolting' 
and 'anachronistic' and had a 'degrading and dehumanising 
effect.' It held that this specific punishment could be 
awarded by a court or by a prison administration only for 
disciplinary reasons. Justice Iyer was more forthright in 
his denunciation of solitary confinement and described it 
as 'near-strangulation of the slender liberty of 
loco-motion inside a prison', an aspect of 'blood thirsty 
prison behaviour', and 'a revolt against society's human 
essence.' The dynamic role of judicial remedies after 
Batra's case imparts to the habeas corpus writ a versatile 
vitality and operational utility that makes the healing 
presence of the law live-up to its reputation as bastion of 
liberty even within jail declared Krishna Iyer, J. In 
order to maintain a petition for habeas corpus, physical 
confinement is not necessary. It is sufficient if some 
kind of control, custody or restrain is exercised over the 
person. 
(B) When Habeas Corpus cannot lie 
The right to constitutional remedies for the loss of 
liberty of the person has been restated in Articles 32 and 
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226 of the constitution of India. In fact. Art. 32 covers 
remedies for enforcement ofany of the rights conferred by 
Part III of the Constitution, in the Supreme Court. The 
article deal with various writs including the writ of 
habeas corpus. The writ of habeas corpus is an effective 
remedy to protect the individual from unlawful imprisonment 
and detention. 
When the person in confinement is so imprisoned 
consequent on sentence of punishment in a criminal case. 
This will be so even if the convicting court had no 
jurisdiction to try. A court has the right to decide 
rightly and wrongly. This can be questioned only in 
appeal. Where the appelate court decided in favour of the 
jurisdiction of the lower court that order has to be 
respected and cannot be treated as a nullity in a habeas 
corpus proceeding. 
The legality or otherwise of the detention at the time 
of the return alone matters in a habeas corpus proceeding, 
not the date of the institution of the proceeding. So an 
intial defective order can be checkmated by a fresh valid 
order of detention by the time of the return of the writ . 
Restraint placed by law declared unconstitutional, cannot 
be avoided by Habeas Corpus. The order may also be shown 
to be ultra vires of the statutes itself. 
1. State of Punjab V. Ajaib Singh, AIR, 1953, S.C. 10. 
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The constitutionality of the law can be challenged in 
habeas corpus. Under Articles 32 and 226, habeas corpus 
can lie only when the detention is by the State or its 
authorities. Mere surveillance by the police is no 
detention and so the writ cannot be in such cases. 
In the case of restoration of children and minors to 
their guardians, the remedy has under the special acts 
(e.g. Guardian and Wards Act) and not under the writ 
provision. But an application under Section 391, Criminal 
Procedure Code was considered proper where there is 
imminent danager to the health, safety or morals of the 
minor. 
Where the order of remand under Section 344 (Cr. P.C. 
1898) by a Magistrate having no jurisdiction is illegal as 
also the detention under such order. As such a habeas 
corpus could rightly lie but in the instant case, the 
accused was later remanded by a Magistrate having 
jurisdiction and the prior illegality was held not to 
affect the later court's powers or jurisdiction. The writ 
of habeas corpus is not available to a person properly 
detained by a Court Martial. The writ cannot go into the 
alleged irregularities in procedure in Court Martial. It 
can only go into the question of the jurisdiction of that 
body. But a Civil Court cannot exercise any supervisory 
1. Jagannath Misra v. State of Orissa, AIR, 1969, Ori. 296 
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control over or review procedural errors generally in the 
proceedings of the Court Martial. VJhere the order of 
detention is justiciable and is made by a cc-petent 
authority and is legally not infirm otherwise, the writ of 
habeas corpus cannot issue . 
When under Article 352(1) read with Article 359(1) the 
fundamental right under -Article 22 is suspended a detenu 
cannot contend that he was not informed under what 
authority he was detained nor the grounds therefore . No 
second petition in habeas corpus will lie under Article 226 
unless a fresh and new ground of attack has arisen. 
The Supreme Court will not objectively independently 
examine what are matters of fact i.e. alleged iminent 
liklihood of objectionable activities, as if it were an 
3 
appellate court . The court will not interfere virh the 
subjective satisfaction of the authority in respecr of an 
order for detention passed under the Maintenance of 
Internal Security Act, 1971. Consequently the reque-r for 
4 
issue of habeas corpus was turned down . Where a person is 
undergoing a sentence of imprisonment imposed by cc-petent 
5 
court, habeas corpus cannot be granted . No cour- will 
is^ sue the writ of the habeas corpus on the basis of 
reckless allegation in an affidvait . 
2. M. Karunanidhi v. M. Raman, Asstt. Commr. of Poli--^, AIR 
1968 Mad. 50. 
1. Dev Raj V. Lt. Governor, Delhi (1967) 69 Pun LR(D 231 
3. Masood Alam v. V.I. (1973) AIR 1973 SC 897 
4. Ibid. 
6.' ibid.^^'"'''"^"'^''^ ^^° ^''- ^' ^^^^^ °^ Or i s sa AIR 1971 sc 2197. 
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(C) Refusal to obey order of habeas corpus 
The writ of habeas corpus has to be obeyed by the 
person to whom it is addressed. The refusal to do so will 
amount to contempt of court. Any wilful interference with 
powers of the High Court in its habeas corpus jurisdiction 
also amounts to contempt. Thus where a detenu applied to 
the High Court in respect of withdrawal of certain 
privilages by Government and the application is withheld by 
some government officer, the latter was held liable in 
contempt for causing such impediment or for delaying the 
forwarding of the detenu's application . The court is 
zealous that its order be obeyed and the majesty of law is 
kept up. So, even an attempt to circumvent the court's 
order by resorting to fraudulent proceedings, will be 
actionable in contempt. If a detention order is rectified 
after the release of the detenu and a fresh order is 
issued, no contempt action can lie unless melafides is 
proved. The Supreme Court can use its direct jurisdiction 
under Article 32. By virtue of its decisions, practically 
every statutory corporation, authority, body or even 
semi-government agency is regarded as an instrument of 
state and falls within the ambit of the writ jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court. Even matters pertaining to the 
service conditions in the court, by-passing the normal 
procedure of the Industrial Dispute Act. 
1. Jyotiroy v. Govt, of W.B.,AIR 1952, Cal. 562. 
2. In Journal of the Bar Council of India, an article 'The 
Indxan Judicial system' by Lalit Bhasin vol. IX, 1982 
C H A P T E R - I V 
HABEAS CORPUS: A SOCIAL RESPONSE 
HABEAS CORPUS: A SOCIAL RESPONSE 
Judicial process is a 'rational, logical and humane 
method of ordering society', and it is highly relevent to a 
pluralistic society which, because of its socio-economic 
and cultural complexities, faces the problem of harmonising 
civil liberties with the development process . In the wake 
of industralisation and urbanisation, a host of new social 
groups have emerged and have, in due course, got 
politicised. The weaker among them no longer accept their 
disadvantageous position and expect the legal system to 
ensure a fair deal to them. Consequently, there are 
increasing demands on the judiciary for positive activism 
and independence. India is no exception to this new trend. 
Of late the Indian Supreme Court has been quite active in 
defence of human rights and has intervened on numerous 
occasions to resist the repression of the poor, the women 
and other weaker sections of society. It has been 
successful to a significant extent in protecting the rights 
of the political have nots who otherwise might have become 
just 'unpersons' and helpless victims of the political 
set-up. 
It is now universally accepted that, with the increase 
in the duties and obligations of the state towards the 
people owing to the socio-economic conditions of today, the 
1. N.R. Madhavan Menon, 'Judiciary in plural societies' 
The Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 8 September 1983 p. 9'. 
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courts are also required to play a more active role 
indefence of public interest. It is no longer enough for 
the judiciary to protect private legal rights, and it is 
necessary for it to relax the rules of standing for the 
redressal of public grievances and injuries. The right to 
move the courts for the violation of personal freedom has 
been long recognised. But the traditional rule of locus 
standi for judicial remedy is restricted to only that 
person who has suffered or is likely to suffer an injury to 
his body, mind, reputation or property on account of the 
violation of his legal right or legally protected interests 
by the impugued action of the state or some public 
authority . Two types of persons qualify for judicial 
relief, firstly those who are 'aggrieved' in terms of the 
definition of the word given in the various statutes; and 
secondly those who move the High Courts under Article 226 
or the Supreme Court under. Article 32 of the 
Constitution. Usually, in both the cases the person has to 
show that he has suffered some loss or injury; in case of 
an alleged violation of a right, he must, in addition, 
prove that he has the right. 
In India, excepting the writ of habeas corpus locus 
standi was accorded only to that person whose personal 
right was violated. But, in the recent cases, this 
emphasis on the violation of personal right has been 
1. S.P. Gupta and others v. Union of India and others, AIR, 
1982 SC. 149, p. 185. 
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given-up. In view of the peculiar socio-economic 
conditions in the country, the courts have in last couple 
of years begun to extend locus standi to the greatest 
possible extent. There is definite liberalisation in the 
traditional concept of locus standi . Such a shift is 
absolutely essential for maintaining rule of law, 
furthering the cause of justice and accelerating the pace 
of realisation of the constitutional imperatives. 
Compensation for illegal detention 
Detention without trial for months or years is inhuman 
and degrading for it takes away a slice of the detenu's 
life, and the legal system which permits this outrage 
surely owes it to the detenu that he be compensated 
financially if his detention is declared illegal suits for 
damages for wrongful imprisonment offer no remedies because 
the statutes sanctioning preventive detention protect the 
erring officials and the government. A safer remedy is 
that, while releasing the detenu, the court should have the 
power to determine damages and award compensation. 
However, the Supreme Court hesitated to recognise the 
principle of monetary compensation for violation of 
fundamental rights, even though it acknowledged the 
inadequacy of conventional judicial remedies in such 
situations. The plea of the blinded undertrial prisoners 
1. Arun Shourie, 'On why the Hon'ble Court, Must Hear US', 
(1981) 4 S.C.C. Journal Section 2. 
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of Bhagalpur Jail for compensation is still awaiting the 
court's decision. Similarly, the decision on the question 
whether or notthe prisoners in Sant Bir and Veena Sethi 
were entitled to compensation from the state government for 
their illegal detention, was postponed to some future 
hearing and they have not been finally disposed off. 
However, of late, the Supreme Court has started 
granting monetary compensation for administrative wrongs 
violating one's fundamental rights , though the law in this 
behalf is yet to be settled. In Rudul Sah v. State of 
2 
Bihar , it recognised the petitioner's right to claim in a 
writ petition compensation for illegal detention. In this 
case, the petitioner was acquitted by the court of session 
in 1968 but, for some mysterious reason, he was released 
from jail 14 years later in 1982. The press got wind of the 
case and reported it. On hearing the incredible tale, a law 
studentof Patna filed a habeas corpus writ petition in the 
Patna High Court and a public-spirited lawyer of New Delhi 
filed a similar petition in the Supreme Court. It was 
because of these petitions that Sah was finally released 
and the court, as an interim measure, awarded him a 
compensation of Rs. 35,000 for the deprivation of his 
liberty, without debarring him from bringing a suit in the 
ordinary courts to recover appropriate damages from the 
State and its erring officials. The monetary compensation 
1. S.N. Jain, 'Money Compensation forAdministrative Wrongs 
Through Article 32', Journal of the Indian Law Institute 
Vol. 25, No. January-March 1983, pp. 118-21. 
2. Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, AIR, 1983 S.C. 1086 
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was unprecedented in as much as it had not been granted 
before as a consequential relief in a case of violation of 
fundamental fights under Article 32. The court also 
desired improvement in the prison administration in Bihar, 
so that the cases of appalling neglect on the part of 
concerned officials did not recur. In another case, Oraon 
V. State of Bihar which commenced on the basis of a letter 
written to Justice Bhagwati, Chairman of the Legal Aid 
Implementation Scheme of the Central Government, by the 
Free Legal Aid Committee of Ranchi, the Supreme Court, 
through Justices Bhagwati and Sabyasachi Mukherjee, ordered 
a compensation of Rs. 15,000 on 12 August 1983 to one Bhoma 
Charan Oraon, who had been illegally kept in the Ranchi 
Mental Asylum for over thirteen years, even after he had 
been certified fit for discharge. 
The judgements in Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar and 
Bhoma Charan Oraon v. State of Bihar are landmarks in the 
history of the decisional law regarding governmental 
liability. They are in sharp contrast to the courts' 
earlier decisions to the effect that, if a public servant 
committed a wrongful act under the powers delegated to hi 
for the discharge of the sovereign functions of state, n 
legal action for damages would be taken against him or his 
employer, the government. Hitherto, the Court had only 
allowed the writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person who 
1. S.N. Jain, 'Money Compensation for Administrative VJrongs 
Through Article 32', Journal of the Indian Law Institute 
Vol. 25, No. 1, January-March 1983 pp. 118-21. 
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was arrested or detained by a public servent and the detenu 
was set at liberty if, after hearing, the detention was 
found to be illegal. The queation of compensation for the 
stress and strain was not gone into. It was left to 
himself to seek redressal of the wrong done to him. And, 
under the existing law, there is hardly any remedy 
available to the victim of a wrong done by a government 
official because Section 197 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure lays down that when a public servent is accused 
of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while 
acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his 
official duty, no court shall take cognisance of such an 
offence, except with the previous sanction of the 
government. This provides an umbrella to the offending 
public servant. 
The Writ of Habeas Corpus to Protect Children 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the lawful 
rights of juvenile offendus kept in juvenile institutions 
and has emphasised a uniform procedure in all the states to 
deal with juveniles. It issued directives for the release 
of such children as and when cases of their plight and 
sexual abuse were brought before it. Although all the 
states except the state of Nagaland have enacted Children's 
Acts, but not even two-thirds of them implement these acts. 
Lack of infrastructure of deal with juvenile offences is 
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perhaps one reason. The ordinary courts are not able to 
cope with the cases of children and about 6,000 children 
below 16 are languishing in prisons . A number of cases 
highlighted the plight of children in juvenile institutions 
In 1981, an Association of Law Teachers brought a writ of 
habeas corpus against the state of Madhya Pradesh for the 
torture of young prisoners in the Chattarpur Jail. In 
2 
another case , the special legal correspondent of the 
Hindustan Times, Krishan Mahajan, along with Lily Thomas 
and Mrs. K. Hingorani, moved the Supreme Court seeking 
relief for certain juvenile undertrial prisoners in the 
Kanpur Central Jail. The contention of the petitioners was 
that, though there was a children's home in Kanpur, about 
one hundred juvenile undertrial prisoners were lodged in 
the Kanpur Central Jail. The court ordered an 
investigation into the matter and held that no person under 
the age of 16 years could be sent to jail and must be 
detained in a children's home or some other place of 
safety. 
A letter to one of the judges by Sanjay Suri and Rahul 
Pathak, reporters of the Indian Express, exposing the 
maltreatment of juvenile prisoners in the Tihar Jail, gave 
rise to yet another case in the Supreme Court^. The letter 
1. Indian Express (New Delhi), 4 December 1982, p. 3. 
2. Munna and others v. State U.P. and others, AIR] 1982 SC. 
806. 
3. Cited in P.N. Bhagwati, 'Human Rights in the Criminal 
Justice System', Journal of the Indian Law Institute, 
Vol. 27, No. 1, January-March 1985, p. 20. ~~ 
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described how the juvenile prisoners were being subjected 
to sexual abuse and were being sodomised by the adult 
prisoners with the connivance of the jail warden. The 
letter was treated as a writ petition and the court 
appointed the District Judge of Delhi as Commissioner to 
hold an enquiry. The District Judge, in his enquiry 
report, confirmed the practice of sodomy and maltreatment. 
On 28 October 1983, a two-judge bench gave directions for 
an immediate transfer of the jail administration. The 
court also suggested that no child among the juveniles with 
the meaning of the Children Act should be sent to jail, 
because the primary object of the Act was to protect the 
child from the jail atmosphere. Non-compliance by some 
courts and state governments compelled the Supreme Court to 
shift the physically handicapped and mentally retarded 
children lodged in various jails to reformataries for 
rehabilitation, expediting investigation and trials against 
them; setting-up of juvenile courts in each district and 
forming cadres of trained magistrates for dealing with such 
cases. The court also desired the enactment of a uniform 
children, throughout India instead of various Acts at state 
2 
level and its earnest implementation by the Parliament . 
1. The bench consisted of P.N. Bhagwati and V.B. Eradi, JJ. 
2. Sheela Barsa II and others v. Union of India and others, 
AIR, 1986 S.C. 1773. The judgement was delivered on the 
basis of a writ petition by Ms. Sheela Barse and M.C. 
Mehta, alleging in human treatment meted out to children 
in various jails. 
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The Writ of Habeas Corpus and Bonded Labour 
Article 23 of the constitution prohibits forced 
labour, and the responsibility for implementing the Bonded 
Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976, lies with the state 
governments. But the state governments have never been 
serious about the identification, release and 
rehabilitation of bonded labourers. Consequently, India 
has seven million bonded workers who live in conditions of 
abject Slavery and the practice of bonded labour in a 
variety of invidious forms continues to exist in almost 
every part of the country. The existence of such a large 
number of bonded labourers is antithetical to the 
constitutional guarantee of civil liberties, democratic 
rights and equality before law. What is more depressing is 
that bonded labour exists not only on the farms of big land 
lords but also in modern industries and construction works 
in the public sector. Surveys of bonded labourers show 
that over 90 percent of them belong to Scheduled Castes and 
Scheduled Tribes and are landless workers. Most of them 
are unaware of the law and their rights; those who know 
have no means to seek redressal of their grievances. Quite 
often, the bureaucracy entrusted with the implementation of 
law adopts an indifferent attitude or actively connives 
with the law breakers . And, when a programme for the 
1. The Hindustan Times, 2 May 1983, p. 9. 
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welfare of labour is taken in hand, there is delay in the 
allotment of funds. The judiciary can come to the rescue 
of bonded labourers also as it has come to that of child 
prisoner. 
Social workers have highlighted the problem of bonded 
labour. The have filed writ petitions against Haryana, 
Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh for the prevalance of 
bonded labour in certain areas of these states. The 
Supreme Court directed the concerned states to identify, 
release and rehabilitate the freed labourers; to ensure 
minimum wages to them; and to constitute vigilance 
committees to monitor the implementation of laws. In early 
1982, social workers of the Gandhi Peace Foundation (New 
Delhi), assisted by Upendra Baxi, filed writ petitions 
against Madhya Pradesh for allowing bonded labour to be 
paid wages in kind in the form of Kesaridal and thereby 
causing the incurable disease of lathyriasm. The court 
ordered investigation and immediate relief to the bonded 
labourers. On 17 September 1982, a division bench of the 
Supreme Court consisting of Justices P.N. Bhagwati and 
Baharul Islam while hearing a case of People's Union for 
Democratic Rights v. Union of India , popularly known as 
the Asiad workers case held that a breach of fundamental 
rights should be looked at in a broader perspective. 
1. AIR 1982 S.C. 1473. 
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Hearing the writ petition field by the PUDR against the bad 
working conditions of the construction workers of the 
various projects connected with the Asian Games, the 
Supreme Court found that the employers had committed 
flagrant violations of the provisions of various labour 
laws . Its judgement in the case shows how an innovative 
approach to the interpretation of the constitution can make 
thelegal system responsive to the needs of the poor. The 
court widened the scope and contents of fundamental rights 
and brought the violation of ordinary statutes by the 
contractors within the ambit of certain fundamental rights 
enforceable against the state. 
The Supreme Court took-up several other cases of 
exploitation, which reinforced its activism. In Sanjit Roy 
2 
V. State of Rajesthan , Sanjit Roy, Director, Social Work 
and Research Centre, which is a social action group based 
in Tilonia in the Ajmer district of Rajesthan, filed a writ 
petition in the Supreme Court on behalf of the construction 
workers who were hired by the Rajesthan Government to baild 
the Madanganj - Harmara road but were not paid the minimum 
wages in violation of the Minimum wages Act, 1948. Keeping 
in view, the new interpretation of Article 23 of the 
constitution given in the Asiad workers case, which 
prohibited all forms of forced labour, Justice Bhagwati 
held that, under Article 23, no person could be required or 
1. Minimum wages Act, 1948; the Equal Remuneration Act, 
1976, the Contract Labour Act, 1970. 
2. Sanjit Roy v. State of Rajesthan, AIR, 1983 S.C. 328, 
The bench consisted of P.N. Bhagwati and R.S. Pathak, JJ 
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permitted to provide labour on payment of anything less 
than the minimum wage; and, if the Examption Act excluded 
the applicability of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, and 
denied the minimum wage to a workman employed even in 
famine relief work, it was clearly violative of Article 23. 
Thus, exemption from the Minimum Wages Act was held 
unconstitutional and the contract labourers working on the 
Madanganj-Harmera Road got two extra rupees as daily 
wages. 
A change for the better is writ large on the judicial 
system. The judiciary especially the Supreme Court has 
shown, time and again, that it is alive to the 
socio-economic environs around it. It has assumed the role 
of a catalyse- and a social engineer deviating from the 
traditional role of a passive spectator involved in the 
arthimatics of constitutional niceties. It has realised 
that 'freedom cannot live, where there is in justice since 
it can flourish only where the souls of men are regarded as 
of a worth too eminent to be degraded by a mean struggle 
for breed'. The judiciary should not be a mere spectator 
but an affirmative participant in the colossal operation of 
socio-economic uplift. An egalitarian social milieu 
guaranteering free development of every citizen is 
desideratum. The judiciary must ensure that legal order 
and justice system respond to the imperatives of the 
national plans, education of poverty, deprivation and 
upholding the dignity of men. 
C H A P T E R - V 
HABEAS CORPUS: AN OVER VIEW 
SiVBEAS CORPUS: AH OVER VIEW 
The writ of habeas corpus is now a constitutionally 
guarantee but even prior to the constitution, the trends of 
judicial pronouncements was against the attempt of 
2 
legislation to exclude habeas corpus remedy expressly or 
inpliedly. As stated in Full Bench Madras case, inspite of 
aprivate clause, habeas corpus could be had -
(a) if the law under which the order has been passed is 
ultra vires; 
(b) if there was bad faith in the authority; 
(c) if the authority had acted outside the limitation 
imposed by law and against the presented procedure; 
(d) if the authority had no power to pass such an order; 
and 
(e) if Ithe order is not applicable to the particular 
detenu. 
The opinion in India is in favour of treating habeas 
corpus as a criminal proceeding. In the United States it is 
regarded as a civil proceeding while in England the nature 
of the proceeding under which the detenu is detained 
decisive. 
When detention is purely under administrative 
discretion, questions of jurisdiction, malafide and the 
1. Basant Chandra Ghose V. Emperor, 1944 Fc 86, 
2. Defence of India Act XXXV of 19 39. 
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legality of the action can be scrutinised where detention 
is by virtue of judicial or quasi-judicial powers, 
different considerations arise. In the case of a judicial 
order, the mere production of a formally, authenticated 
judgement is conclusive of the legality of the order of 
detention. In the case of quasi-judicial order, 
jurisdiction and fairness of procedure can be mooted. But 
the sufficiency of evidence on merits is left entirely to 
the special tribunal. 
There is always the inharent danger of the authority 
abusing his power, rendering habeas corpus difficult." But 
here the vigilence of courts is needed to detect malafide 
or abuse of power. 
In the matter of alternate remedies where statutes 
provide the remedy by way of appeal or otherwise, 
exhaustion of these remedies are advisable before resort to 
habeas corpus. Of course, when resort under Article 32 is 
taken, the question of alternative remedy recedes since 
that is no answer when a fundamental right is affected. 
The practice of allowing appeals against orders in 
habeas corpus petitions is healthy as it leads to 
uniformity in the interpretation of the laws. The 
judiciary is also expected to expose any tendency on the 
part of the administration when the concept of public 
interest is sought to be exploited by the authority. More 
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then all, the subjective satisfaction theory should be 
restricted to the narrowest limit and the ambit of review 
in detention cases should be increased. 
The writ of habeas corpus is a prerogative process for 
securing the liberty of the detenu by affording an 
effective means of immediate release from unlawful or 
unjustifiable detention, whether in prison or in private 
custody. Historically it is a prerogative writ by which 
the king had a right to inquire into the causes for which 
any of his subjects are deprived of their liberty. 'If 
any man is imprisoned by another, a habeas corpus can be 
granted to those who imprison him, for the king ought to 
have an account rendered to his concerning the liberty of 
2 
his subjects and the restraint thereof.' It is a writ 
directed to a person detaining another and commanding him 
to produce the body of the prisoner, at a certain time and 
place, with the day and cause of his caption and detention, 
to do, submit to, and receive whatever the judge or 
Government awarding -the writ shall consider in that behalf. 
It is a high prerogative writ having for its object the 
speedy release by judicial decree of persons who are 
illegally restrained of their liberty or illegally detained 
from the control of those who are entitled to the custody 
of them. Blackstone, speaking of the writ say, 'this is a 
high prerogative writ, and therefore, by common law, issues 
1. Crowley's Case (1818) 2 Swan. 1 
2. 2 Roll. Abr. 69. 
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out of the King's Bench by a fiat from the Chief Justice, 
or any other of the judges, running to all parts of the 
King's Dominions, for the King is at all times entitled to 
have an account why the liberty of any of his subjects, is 
restrained, wherever the restraint may be inflicted." In 
short by means of habeas corpus, the High Court at the 
instance of the subject aggrieved commands the production 
of that subject and inquires into the cause of his 
imprisonment If there is no legal justification for the 
detention, the party is ordered to be released. 
The writ is available as a remedy in all cases of 
wrongful deprivation of personal liberty. The scope of the 
writ when directed to an inquiry into the cause of 
imprisonment for criminal or supposed criminal causes, 
extents to questions affecting the jurisdiction of the 
court, the sufficiency in point of law of the proceedings 
and the validity and regularity of the commitment order 
under which the applicant is detained. Where the restraint 
is imposed on civil grounds under claim of authority, the 
legal validity of such claim may be investigated and 
determined, and where, as frequently arises in the case of 
infants, conflicting claims for the custody of the same 
individual are raised, such claims -may be enquired into on 
the return to a writ of habeas corpus. In other cases 
where personal freedom of an individual is wrongly 
1, Black, Com. Vol. Ill, p. 131. 
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interfered with by another, the release of the former from 
the illegal detention may be effected by habeas corpus. 
Thus, if a child is forcibly kept apart from his parents, 
if a man is wrongfully kept in confinement as a lunatie, if 
a nun is alleged to be prevented from leaving her convent, 
if, in short, any man, woman, or child is arrested on 
apparently good grounds to be, deprived of liberty the 
court will always issue a writ of habeas corpus to any one 
who has the aggrieved person in his custody to have such 
person brought before the court and if he is suffering 
restraint without lawful cause, set him free. The illegal 
detention of a subject, that is a detention or 
imprisonment, which is incapable of legal justification, is 
the basis of jurisdiction in habeas corpus. This is 
apparent from the very wording of the writ which requires 
the person to whom it is addressed to have the body of the 
person named therein who is taken and detained under some 
one's custody, as is said, together with the day and cause 
of his being taken and detained, to undergo and receive all 
and singular such matters and things as the court shall 
then and there consider of concerning him on this behalf. 
It can, however, be refused where there is an alternative 
remedy by which the validity of the detention may be 
questioned. 
The writ is of a remedial nature and is not used as an 
instrument of punishment. The object of the writ is not to 
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punish previous illegality, but to release from previous 
illegal detention. On this principle it has been held to 
be inapplicable if the illegal detention has ceased before 
the application for the writ is made when it is clear that 
the person charged with unlawfully detaining another has 
defacts ceased to have any custody or control of him, the 
writ will not be issued, where, however, a counterfeited 
release has taken place, and a pretended ignorance of the 
place of custody or of the identity of the custodian is 
insisted upon a court may, and ought to, examine into the 
facts, because the detention is in fact being continued by 
some one who is really the agent of the original wrongdoer. 
A man who parts with the custody of a child after he is 
served with a writ of habeas corpus, and who evades service 
in order that he may get rid of such custody, commits a 
plain contempt for which he is answerable to the court. In 
such a case it is doubtful whether it is competent and it 
is certainty inexpedient, to enforce the writ of habeas 
corpus. The case is, under such circumstances, dealt with 
as one of contempt, and the court has power to pronounce an 
order which will compel custodian to choose between placing 
himself in a position which will make him liable to the 
writ or bearing the consequence of his contumacy. On the 
other hand, where a person absolutely gives up the custody 
and control of a child from the mere apprehension that by 
retaining him, he may become liable to a writ of habeas 
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corpus and without any notice that such a proceeding will 
be taken, apparently no contempt is committed. 
Fundamental rights of citizens are not absolute and 
are contigent upon society. In a civil society, neither 
unfettered freedom nor complete immunity from restraint and 
interference is possible, for that would lead to anarchy. 
Consequently, the desires of an individual have to be 
controlled, regulated and reconciled with the desires of 
other individuals. Fundamental rights, thus, signify those 
rights or liberties which should be guaranteed to a citizen 
without in any way harming similar rights of other 
citizens. The very concept of fundamental rights carries 
judicious limits to it . 
Role of Supreme Court 
The Indian Constitution enjoins the judiciary to 
uphold the Constitution and thereby makes the Supreme Court 
the final interpreter of laws. By interpreting the 
provisions of the Constitution, the judiciary helps the 
political system adjust itself to the realities of the 
changing situations. It is expected to secure to all its 
citizens certain cherished human rights, including social 
economic and political justice as embodied in the chapter 
on Fundamental Rights. The Supreme Court has safeguarded 
the fundamental rights of the people since 1950 in the wake 
1. A.K.Gopalan V. State of Madras, A.I.R., 1950 Sc. 27. 
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of the state acquiring more and more powers to discharge 
its welfare functions. The constitution makers took 
precautions to balance the interests of welfare and liberty 
so that the former did not trample upon the latter. 
Soon after the constitution had come into force, the 
Supreme Court was called upon to define the scope of 
liberty in A.K. Gopalan . A.K. Gopalan, a communist 
leader, was detained in Madras jail. In fact, he has been 
in detention since 1947. He was, tine and again, arrested 
under the ordinary criminal law but every time the arrest 
was set aside. When he was still under detention under the 
orders of the State Government, on 1 March 1950, he was 
served with a fresh order of detention under Section 3(i) 
of Preventive Detention Act, 1950. Gopalan contended that 
detention deprived him of his right to personal liberty 
guaranteed under Article 21; that 'personal liberty in 
Article 21 include all the freedoms conferred by 
2 
Article 19(1) (a) to (g) ; that it includes the right of 
free movement conferred by Article 19(1)(d) because freedom 
1. Ibid. 
2. Article 19 of the Constitution of India reads, 
'Protection of Certain rights regarding freedom of 
speech etc." -
(i) All citizens shall have to right -
(a) to freedom of speech and expression; 
(b) to assemble peaceably and without arms; 
(c) to form associations or unions; 
(d) to move freely throughout the te/itory of India; 
(e) to reside and settle in any part of the territory 
of India; and 
(g) to practice any prof ession,, or to carry on any 
occupation, trade or business. 
'and' inserted and sub-clause (f) omitted by the 
constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978. 
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of movement was the essence of personal liberty and, 
therefore, the Preventive Detention Act of 1950 should also 
satisfy the requirements of Article 19(1). 
In Gopalan, the Supreme Court took a highly 
conservative view of personal liberty. Rejecting the 
American interpretation of liberty, it gave a restricted 
meaning to the expression 'personal liberty' and viewed it 
only as an antithesis of physical restraint or coercion. 
Justice Mukherji adopted Ducy's definition of personal 
liberty and observed that it was 'a personal right not to 
be subjected to imprisonment, arrest or other physical 
coercion in in any manner that does not admit of legal 
justification'. It was, in his opinion, this negative 
right of not being subjected to any form of physical 
restraint or coercion without the sanction of law that 
constituted the essence of personal liberty and not mere 
freedom to move to any part of the Indian tenitory. 
Years later, the question whether or not the 
provisions of Article 19 could be read into other 
fundamental rights came up for consideration in the Bank 
Nationalisation case. The Supreme court clearly spelt out 
the interaction of thevarious fundamental rights and held 
that the infringement of any one of them was determined 
neither by the object of the lagislature nor by the form of 
action but by its direct impact on individual rights. It 
was the first step towards making fundamental rights really 
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more fundamental and meaningful. The judiciary, however, 
recieved a set back during the emergency when judicial 
review of executive action was totally barred and a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus was not maintainable. 
As a result of the decision of the Supreme Court in the 
A.D.M. Jabalpur V. Shivakant Shukla popularly known as the 
Habeas Corpus case, thousands of petitions pending before 
the High Courts were dismissed summarily without going into 
the merits of each case. 
After the withdrawal of internal emergency, the 
Supreme Court realised the serious consequences of its 
pronouncements, particular those of its denial of the writ 
of habeas corpus in Shivakant Shukla. The erosion of 
personal liberties was checked by the Forty-Fourth 
Constitutional Amendment Act, 1978 enacted by the Janta 
Government when it came to power after the Sixth General 
Elections. The court eagerly grasped this opportunity to 
rehabilitate itself and began rebuilding its prestige and 
power. In a series of decisions culminating in Maneka 
Gandhi, it tried to raise judicial review to a conscious, 
creative and civil libertarian activism. 
2 
The decision of the Supreme Court m Maneka Gandhi 
was one of immense constitutional significance, as it was 
the first major decision concerning personal liberty since 
the Habeas Corpus Case. The Seven-judge Constitutional 
1. A.D.M. Jabalpur V. Shivakant Shukla, A.I.R.,1976 Sc 1207 
2.Maneka Gandhi V. Union of India, A.I.R., 1978 Sc. 597. 
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Bench examined the concept of personal liberty in general 
and the right to travel abroad in particular. In this case, 
the petitioner's (Mrs. Maneka Gandhi's) passport was 
impounded under Section 10(3)(c) of the Passport Act, 1967, 
in public interest under an order of the Government of 
India dated 2 July, 1977, without furnishing any reasons. 
The only was challenged on the ground that it violates 
articles 14, 19 and 21 of the constitution. The court held 
that impounding the passport without hearing was not valid, 
but it opined that a post-decisional hearing would satisfy 
the requirements of justice. As regards the violation of 
Articles 19 and 21, the court held that the impounding of 
the petitioner's passport had violated Article 21 and not 
Article 19. The court laid a greater emphasis on the 
procedural safeguards to be compiled with before an 
individual was deprived of his personal liberty. Justice 
Bhagwati preferred a wider interpretation of the term. He 
opined that 'personal liberty' in Article 21 implied that a 
citizen was entitled to all those rights also which are 
unenumerated. After Maneka the court came out with a 
series of pronouncements echoing personal freedom and 
judicial activism. The height was reacted when on the 
basis of the court issued orders to officials to submit 
detailed reports. In its various judgements , it has 
1. Sunil Batra I V. Delhi Administration, A.I.R., 1978, 
Sc. 1675. 
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strongly denounced the cruel and barbarous treatment meted 
out to undertrials in particular. 
Of late, there is a growing feeling in the Supreme 
Court that the provisions of Article 32 of the Constitution 
are being misused Lawyers are turning ordinary grievances 
into cases of violation of fundamental rights, thus 
burdening the Supreme Court. Ironically, the 
constitutional provision which was envisaged to protect the 
rights of the people and the deprived is being manipulated 
to serve the interests of the rich. 
This latest trend of the highest court was 
crystallised on 2 November 1987 in the contentions case of 
P.N. Kumar V. Municipal Corporation of Delhi . The 
petition was filed under Article 32 of the constitution by 
the Siddharta Continental Hotel challenging the assessment 
of the reteable value of its property by the Municipal 
Corporation. A two-judge bench comprising Justices 
Venkataramiah and K.N. Singh, before whom the case came-up, 
asked the petitioners to go to the High Court under 
Article 226 on the ground that it was a better forum for 
relief in property matters. The judges argued that the 
scope of the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of 
the Constitution was wider than that of the Supreme Court 
under Article 32. Therefore, the Court ruled that if the 
1. P.N. Kumar V. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (1987) 4 
S.c.c. 609. 
108 
parties could get relief in the High Court, why should they 
burden the Supreme Court? What the judges were trying to 
stress in their order was that the Supreme Court had no 
time even to dispose off cases which had been decided by 
it. Hence, lawyers should be cautious in using Article 32 
of the Constitution, which guarantees right to petition to 
the Supreme Court in cases of fundamental rights 
violations. The Court held that the same point of law was 
pending in the Supreme Court was no basis of entertaining a 
petition directly by passing the High Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The progress of a nation, its unity and integrity, 
rule of law and social equality depend on the judiciary to 
a great extent; and the Supreme Court's performance has to 
be judged on the basis of the degree of its success in 
fulfilling these tasks. In India, these goals have not 
been fully achieved, but it is undemable that the Supreme 
Court has done its job judiciously, despite its 
limitations. Justice Douglas of the U.S. once observed 
about his own Court, "Certainly our own Supreme Court has 
erred, sometimes grievously. But in the main it has stood 
above the storms, administering justice according to its 
best lights". The same can be said of the Supreme Court of 
India. In the beginning, perhaps owing to the conditions 
prevailing then, it gave a narrow interpretation to the 
2 
right to fre'edom in Gopalan , but in the subsequent cases 
it stood firmly on the side of personal freedom and social 
progress and change. It also set the deteneu at liberty 
were one among the several grounds of detention was vague 
or irrelevant. This progressive interpretation of law was 
virtually halted when during the internal emergency, in 
3 Shivakant Shukla's , the court rejected the writ of habeas 
1. William O. Doughles, we the judges, studies in American 
and Indian Constitutional Law. From Marchall to 
Mukherjee (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1956), 
p. 81. 
2. A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, (1950) 1 S.C.R., 88. 
3. A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla, AIR, 1976,SC. 1207. 
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corpus and shut its doors. This deviation from the 
unimpeachable standards of judicial review for which there 
was a controlling authority in the Makhan Singh decision 
of the court, greatly damaged the credibility of the 
judicial system as a protector of citizen's rights. 
However, the court soon asserted itself in the sphere of 
civil liberties and made full use of the principles of 
natural justice and procedural fairness in the subsequent 
cases- The principle of procedural fairness was first 
2 
enunciated in Bank Nationalisation and culminated xn 
•3 
Maneka Gandhi . After Maneka Gandhi, there has been a 
remarkable break through in the Indian jurisprudence and 
new dimensions were given to the expressions "life" and 
"personal liberty". The post-emergency era witnessed an 
activist stance in interpreting fundamental rights and has 
revealed the assertive native of the Supreme Court. 
No doubt, judiciary is vital to safeguard the civil 
liberties of the people, but it above cannot ensure their 
preservation. It is simplistic to assume that liberal 
judicial pronouncements can compensate for defective 
legislation. It should not be forgotten that the judicial 
process cannot by itself bring about effective 
implementation of rights and liberties. The orders and 
1. Makhan Singh v. The State of Punjab, AIR, 1964, SC 381. 
2. Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 3 
S.C.R. 530. 
3. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR, 1978 S.C. 597. 
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directions of the court are not self-executing and have to 
be enforced by the executive. The people have to be roused 
from their slumber and they have to come together in 
participatory organisations to demand their rights. Social 
welfare and relief institutions must help create a movement 
for fundamental rights and monitor the implementation of 
directions given by the Supreme Court. 
Such institutions do not become irrelevant simply 
because it is the constitutional oblegation of the 
government to ensure justice, equality of status to all 
citizens. They are needed precisely because the government 
has not been fully alive to its responsibilities and the 
infringement of fundamental rights and civil liberties 
which are as frequent in our country as the religious 
festivals. One reason for this could be perhaps due to 
lack of awareness among the citizens about their rights. 
The protection of the fundamental rights and the prevention 
of the atrocities on undertrials and prisoners, women and 
children and other exploited and dispossessed sections of 
society require all round efforts on the part of 
legislature, executive and judiciary. A vigilant and an 
assertive press is equally indispensable to provide a new 
ethos to fulfil Tagore's dream, Gandhi's meditation and 
Nehru's vision. 
Appendix - I 
MAGNA CARTA, 1215 
JOHN, by the grace of God, king of England, lord 
of Ireland, duke of Normandy and Aquitaine, count of Anjou 
to the archbishops, bishops, abbots, earls, barons, 
justiciars, foresters, sheriffs, reeves, servants, and all 
bailiffs and his faithful people greeting. Know that by 
the suggestion of God and for the good of our soul and 
those of all our predecessors and of our heirs, to the 
honor of God and the exaltation of holy church, and the 
improvement of our kingdom, by the advice of . . . [twenty 
seven barons and church lords] ... and others of our 
faithful. 
1. In the first place we have granted to God, and 
by this our present charter confirmed, for us and our heirs 
forever, that the English church shall be free, and shall 
hold its rights entire and its liberties uninjured; and ... 
that the freedom of elections, which is considered to be 
most important and especially necessary to the English 
church ... we will observe and ... we will shall be 
observed in good faith by our heirs forever. 
We have granted moreover to all free men of our 
kingdom for us and our heirs forever all the liberties 
written below . . . 
12. No scutage or aid shall be imposed in our 
kingdom except by the common council of our kingdom, except 
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for the ransoming of our body, for the making of our oldest 
son a knight, and for once marrying our oldest daughter, 
and for these purposes it shall be only a reasonable aid; 
in the same way it shall be done concerning the aids of the 
city of London. 
13. And the city of London shall have all its ancient 
liberties and free customs . . . Moreover, we will and 
grant that all other cities and boroughs and villages and 
ports shall have all their liberties and free customs. 
14. And for holding a common council of the kingdom 
concerning the assessment of an aid otherwise than in the 
three cases mentioned above, or concerning the assessment 
of a scutage we shall cause to be summoned the archbishops, 
bishops, abbots, earls, and greater barons . . . and . . . 
all those who hold from us in chief, for a certain day ... 
and for a certain place; and in all the letters of that 
summons, we will express the cause of the summons, and ... 
the business shall proceed on the appointed day, on the 
advice of those who shall be present . . . 
17. The common pleas shall not follow our court, but 
shall be held in some certain place. 
18. The recognition of novel disseisin, mort d'ances-
tor , and darrein presentment shall be held only in their 
own countries and in this manner; we, . . . will send two 
justiciars through each county four times a year, who with 
four knights of each county, elected by the county. Shall 
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hold in the county, and on the day and in the place of the 
county court, the aforesaid assizes of the county. 
19. And if the aforesaid assizes cannot be held 
within the day of the county court, asufficient number of 
knights and freeholders shall remain from those who were 
present at the county court on that day to give the 
judgements . . . 
20. A free man shall not be fined fora small offence, 
except in proportion to the measure of the offence; and for 
a great offence he shall be fined in proportion to the 
magnitude of the offence, saving his freehold; and a 
merchant in the same way, saving his merchandise; and the 
villain shall be fined in the same way, saving his wainage, 
if he shall be at our mercy; and none of the above fines 
shall be imposed except by the oaths of honest men of the 
neighborhood. 
21. Earls and barons shall only be fined by their 
peers, and only in proportion to their offence. 
22. A elergyman shall be fined, like those before 
mentioned, only in proportion to his lay holding . . . 
30. No sheriff of bailiff or ours or anyone else 
shall take horses or wagons of any free man for carrying 
purposes except on the permission of that free man. 
31. Neither we nor our bailiffs will take the wood of 
another man for castles, or for anying else which we are 
doing, except by the permission of him to whom the wood 
belongs. 
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32. We will not hold the lands of those convicted of 
a felony for more than a year and a day, after which the 
lands shall be returned to the lords of the fiefs. . . . 
34. The writ which is called praecipe shall not be 
given for the future to anyone concerning any tenement by 
which a free man can lose his court. 
35. There shall be one measure of wine throughout our 
whole kingdom, and one measure of ale, and one measure of 
grain. . . . and one width of dyed cloth and of russets 
and of halbergets . . . ; of weights, moreover it shall be 
as of measures. 
36. Nothing shall henceforth be given or taken for a 
writ of inquisition concerning life or limbs, but it shall 
be given freely and not denied. . . . 
38. No bailiff for the future shall put anyone of his 
law on his simple affirmation, without credible witnesses 
broughtfor this purpose. 
39. No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or 
dispossessed, or outlawed, or banished, or in any way 
destroyed, . . . except by the legal judgement of his peers 
or by the law of the land. 
40. To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny, 
or delay right or justice. 
41. All merchants shall be safe and secure in going 
outfrom England and coming into England and in remaining 
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and going through England, . . • free from all evil tolls, 
by the ancient and rightful customs, except in time of war, 
and if they are of a land at war with us . . . 
42. It is allowed henceforth to anyone to go out from 
our kingdom, and to return, safely and securely, by land 
and by water, saving their fidelity to us, except in time 
of war for some short time, for the common good of the 
kingdom; excepting persons imprisoned and outlawed 
according to the law of the realm, and people of a land at 
war with us . . . 
45. We will not make justiciars, constables, sheriffs 
or bailiffs except of such as know the law of the realm and 
are well inclined to observe it. . . . 
54. No one shall be seized nor imprisoned on the 
appeal of a woman concerning the death of any one except 
her Tiusband. 
55. All fines which have been imposed unjustly and 
against the law of the land, and all penalities imposed 
unjustly and against the law of the land are altogether 
excused, or will be on the judgement of the twenty-five 
barons of whom mention is made below in connection with the 
security of the peace, or on the judgement of the majority 
of them, along with the aforesaid Stephen,archbishop of 
Canterbury, if he is able to be present, and others whom he 
may wish to call for this purpose along with him. . . . 
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61. Since, moreover, for the sake of God, and for the 
improvement of our kingdom, and for the better quieting of 
the hostility sprung up lately between us and our barons, 
we . . . concede to them the security described below; that 
is to say, that they shall elect twenty-five barons of the 
kingdom, whom they will, who ought with all their power to 
observe, hold, and cause to be observed, the peace and 
liberties which we have conceded to them, and by this our 
present charter confirmed to them; in this manner, that if 
we or our justiciar, or our bailiffs, or any one of our 
servants shall have done wrong in any way toward any one, 
or shall have transgressed any of the articles of peace or 
security, and the wrong shall have been shown to four 
barons of the aforesaid twenty-five barons, let those four 
barons come to us . . . laying before us the transgression 
to be corrected without delay. And if we shall not have 
corrected the transgression . . . within a period of forty 
days . . . the aforesaid four barons shall refer the matter 
to the remainder of the twenty-five barons, and let these 
twenty-five barons with the whole community of the country 
distress and injure us in every way they can; that is to 
say by the seizure of our castles, lands, possessions, and 
in such other ways as they can until it shall have been 
corrected according to their judgement, saving our person 
and that of our queen, and those of our children; and when 
the correction has been made, let them devote themselves to 
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us as they did before. And let whoever in the country-
wishes take an oath that in all the above-mentioned 
measures he will obey the orders of the aforesaid 
twenty-five barons . . . All those, moreover, in the 
country who of themselves and their own will are unwilling 
to take an oath to the twenty-five barons as to distressing 
and injuring us along with them, we will compel to take the 
oath by our mandate, as before said. And if any one of the 
twenty-five barons shall have died or departed from the 
land or shall in any other way be prevented from taking the 
above- mentioned action, let the remainder of the aforesaid 
twenty-five barons choose another in his place . . . In 
all those things, moreoever, which are committed to those 
five and twenty barons to carry out, if perhaps the 
twenty-five are present, and some disagreement arises among 
them about something, or if any of them when they have been 
summoned are not willing or are not able to be present, let 
that be considered valid and firm which the greater part of 
those who are present arrange or command, just as if the 
whole twenty-five had agreed in this; and let the aforesaid 
twenty-five swear that they will observe faithfully all the 
things which are said above, and with all their ability 
cause them to be observed. And we will obtain nothing from 
any one, either by ourselves or by another by which any of 
these concessions and liberties shall be revoked or 
diminished; and if any such thing shall have been obtained. 
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let it be invalid and void, and we will never use it by 
ouselves or by another. . . . 
63. Wherefore we will and firmly command that the 
Church of England shall be free, and that the men in our 
kingdom shall have and hold all the aforesaid liberties, 
rights and concessions, well and peacefully> freely and 
quietly, fully and completely, for themselves and their 
heirs, from us and our heirs, in all things and places, 
forever, as before said. It has been sworn, moreover, as 
well on our part as on the part of the barons, that all 
these things spoken of above shall be observed in good 
faith and without any evil intent. Witness the above named 
and many others. Given by our hand in the meadow which is 
called Runnymede, between Windsor and Staines, on the 
fifteenth day of June in the seventeenth year of our 
reign. 
Appendix - II 
HABEAS CORPUS ACT, 1640 
Whereas by the Magna Carta many times confirmed in 
Parliament, it is enacted that no freeman shall be taken or 
imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold or liberties or 
free customs, or be outlawed or exiled or otherwise 
destroyed, and that the King will not pass upon him or 
condemn him but by lawful judgement of his peers or by the 
law of the land; and by another statute . . . no man shall 
be attached by any accusation nor forejudged of life or 
limb, nor his lands, tenements, goods nor chattels seized 
into the King's hands against the form of the Great Charter 
and the law of the land; and by another statute . . . none 
shall be taken by petition or suggestion made to the King 
or to his Council, unless it be by indictment or 
presentment of good and lawful people of the same 
neighbourhood where such deeds be done, in due manner or by 
pocess made by writ original at the common law, and that 
none be put out of his franchise or freehold unless he be 
duly brought into answer and forejudged of the same by the 
course of the law, and if anything be done against the 
same, it shall be redressed and holden for none; and by 
another statute . . . no man of what estate or condition 
soever he be shall be put out of his lands or tenements, 
nor taken nor imprisoned nor disinherited without being 
brought into answer by due process of law; and by another 
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statute . . . it is enacted, that no man be put to answer 
without presentment before Justices or matter of record, or 
by due process and writ original according to the old law 
of the land, and if anything be done to the contrary, it 
shall be void in law and holden for error; and by another 
statute . . . all pleas which shall be pleaded in any 
Courts before any of the King's Justices, or in his other 
places, or before any of his other ministers, or in the 
Courts and places of any other Lords within the realm, 
shall be entered and enrolled in Latin; and whereas by the 
statute made in the third year of King Henry the Seventh, 
power is given to the Chancellor, the Lord Treasurer of 
England for the time being, and the Keeper of the King's 
Privy Seal, or two of them, calling unto them a Bishop and 
a Temporal Lord of the King's most honorable Council, and 
the two Chief Justices of the King's Bench and Common Pleas 
for the time being, or other two Justices in their absence, 
to proceed as in that Act is expressed for the punishment 
of some particular offences therein mentioned; and by the 
statute made in the one-and twentieth year of King Henry 
the Eighth, the President of the Council is associated to 
join with the Lord Chancellor and other Judges in the said 
statute of the third year of Henry the Seventh mentioned: 
but the said Judges have not kept themselves to the points 
limited by the said statute, but have undertaken to punish 
where no law doth warrant, and to make decrees for things 
having no such authority, and to inflict heavier 
punishments than by any law is warranted; 
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II. Forasmuch as all matters examinable or 
determinable bfore the said Judges, or in the Court 
commonly called the Star Chamber, may have their proper 
remedy and redress, and ' their due punishment and 
correction, by the common law of the land, and in the 
ordinary course of justice elsewhere; and forasmuch as the 
reasons and motives inducing the erection and continuance 
of that Court do now cease; and the proceedings, censures 
and decrees of that Court have by experience been found to 
be an in tolerable burden to the subjects, and the means to 
introduce an arbitrary power and government; and forasmuch 
as the Council Table hath of late times assumed unto itself 
a power to intermeddle in civil causes and matters only of 
private interest between party and party, and have 
adventured to determine of the estates and liberties of the 
subject, contrary to the law of the land and the rights and 
privileges of the subject, by which great and manifold 
mischiefs and inconveniences have arisen and happened, and 
much undertainty by means of such proceedings hath been 
conceived concerning men's rights and estates: for settling 
whereof and preventing the like in time to come: 
III. Be it ordained and enacted by the authority of 
this present Parliament, that the said Court commonly 
called the Star Chamber, and all jurisdiction, power and 
authority belonging unto or exercised in the same Court, or 
by any of the Judges, Officers or Ministers thereof, be ... 
12: 
clerly and absolutely dissolved, taken away, and 
determined; . . . and that all and every Act and Acts of 
Parliament . . . by which any jurisdiction, power or 
authority is given . . . unto the said Court ... shall . . . 
be ... repealed and absolutely revoked and made void. 
IV. And be it likewise enacted, that the like 
jurisdiction now used and exercised in the Court before the 
President and Council in the Marches of Wales; and also in 
the Court before the President and Council established in 
the northern parts; and also in the Court commonly called 
the Court of the Duchy of Lancaster . . . ; and also in the 
Court of Exchequer of the County Palatine of Chester . . . ; 
shall . . . be also repealed and absolutely revoked and 
made void . . .; and that from henceforth no court, 
council, or place of judicature shall be erected, ordained, 
constituted, or appointed within this realm of England or 
dominion of Wales, which shall have, use or exercise the 
same or the like jurisdiction, as is or hath been used, 
practised or exercised in the said Court of Star Chamber. 
V. Be it likewise declared and enacted by authority 
of this present Parliament, that neither His Majesty nor 
his Privy Council have or ought to have any jurisdiction, 
power or authority by English bill, petition, articles, 
libel, or any other arbitrary way whatsoever, to examine or 
draw into question, determine or dispose of the lands, 
tenements, hereditaments, goods or chattels of any the 
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subjects of this kingdom, but that the same ought to be 
tried and determined in the ordinary Courts of Justice and 
by the ordinary course of the law. 
Appendix - III 
BILL OF RIGHTS, 1689 
Whereas the lords spiritual and temporal and commons 
assembled at Westminster lawfully, fully and freely 
representing all the estates of the people of this realm, 
did . . . present unto. Their Majesties, . . . William and 
Mary, . . . a certain declaration . . . in the words 
following viz.: 
Whereas the late king James the Second by the 
assistance of divers evil counsellors, judges and ministers 
did endeavour to subvert and extirpate the 
Protestant religion and the laws and liberties of this 
kingdom. . . . 
And whereas the said late king James the Second 
having abdicated the government and the throne being 
thereby vacant, His Highness the prince of Orange . . . did 
(by the advice of the lords spiritual and temporal and 
divers principal persons of the commons) cause letters to 
be written to the lords spiritual and temporal, being 
Protestants; and other letters to the several countries, 
cities, universities, boroughs and Cinque ports for the 
choosing of such persons to represent them, as were of 
right to be sent to parliament, . . . in order to such an 
establishment as that their religion, laws and liberties 
might not again be in danger of being subverted . . . 
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And thereupon the said lords spiritual and temporal 
and commons . . . being now assembled in a full and free 
representative of this nation, taking into their most 
serious consideration the best means for attaining the ends 
aforesaid, do in the first place (as their ancestors in 
like case have usually done) for the vindicating and 
asserting their ancient rights and liberties, declare: 
That the pretended power of suspending of laws or the 
execution of laws by regal authority without consent of 
parliament is illegal. 
That the pretended power of dispensing with laws or 
the execution of laws by regal authority as it hath been 
assumed and exercised of late is illegal. 
That the commission for erecting the late court of 
commissioners for ecclesiastical causes and all 
other commissions and courts of like nature are illegal and 
pernicious. 
That the levying money for or to the use of the crown 
by pretence of prerogative without grant of parliament for 
a longer time or in other manner than the same is or shall 
be granted is illegal. 
That it is the right of the subjects to petition tije 
king and all commitments and prosecutions for such 
petitioning are illegal. 
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That the raising or keeping a standing army within 
the kingdom in time of peace unless it be with consent of 
parliament is against law. 
That the subjects which are Protestants may have arms 
for their defence suitable to their conditions and as 
allowed by law. 
That election of members of parliament ought to be 
free. 
That the freedom of speech and debates or proceedings 
in parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in 
any court or place out of parliament. 
That excessive bail ought not to be required nor 
excessive fines imposed nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted. 
That jurors ought to be duly impanelled and returned 
and jurors which pass upon men in trials for high treason 
ought to be freeholders. 
That all grants and promises of fines and forfeitures 
of particular persons before conviction are illegal and 
void. 
And that for redress of all grievances and for the 
amending, strengthening and preserving of the laws 
parliaments ought to be held frequently. 
And they do claim, demand and insist upon all and 
singular the premises as their undoubted rights and 
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liberties and that no declarations, judgements, doings or 
proceedings to the prejudice of the people in any of the 
said premises ought in any wise to be drawn hereafter into 
consequence or example. To which demand of their rights 
they are particularly encouraged by the declaration of His 
Highness the prince of Orange as being the only means for 
obtaining a full redress and remedy therein. Having 
therefore an entire confidence that His said Highness the 
prince of Orange will perfect the deliverance so far 
advanced by him, and will still preserve them from the 
violation of their rights, which they have here asserted, 
and from all other attempts upon their religion, rights and 
liberties, the said lordsspiritual and temporal and commons 
assembled at Westminster do resolve, that William and Mary, 
prince and princess of Orange, be and be declared king and 
queen of England, France and Ireland and the dominions 
thereunto belonging . . . 
Upon which Their said Majesties did accept the crown 
and royal dignity of the kingdoms of England, France and 
Ireland and the dominions thereunto belonging, according to 
the resolution and desire of the said lords and commons, 
contained in the said declaration. And thereupon Their 
Majesties were pleased, that the said lords spiritual and 
temporal and commons being the two houses of parliament 
should continue to sit, and with Their Majesties' royal 
concurrence make effectual provision for the settlement of 
the religion, laws and liberties of this kingdom . . . Now 
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in pursuance of the premises, the lords spiritual and 
temporal and commons in parliament assembled . . . do pray 
that . . . all and singular the rights and liberties 
asserted and claimed in the said declaration are the true, 
ancient and indubitable rights and liberties of the people 
of this kingdom, and . . . shall be firmly and strictly 
holden and observed . . . , and all officers and ministers 
whatsoever shall serve Their Majesties and their successors 
according to the same in all times to come. . . . 
II. And be it further declared and enacted by the 
authority aforesaid, that, from and after this present 
session of parliament, no dispensation by non obstante of 
or to any statute or any part thereof shall be allowed, but 
that the same shall be held void and of no effect, except a 
dispensation be allowed of in such statute, and except in 
such case as shall be specially provided for by one or more 
bill or bills to be passed during this present session of 
parliament. 
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